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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
t

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

i

LEW DAY,

:
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900517-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of manslaughter, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205
(1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

requested jury instruction on the additional lesser included
offense of negligent homicide?

The trial court's decision that a

defendant is not entitled to a lesser included offense
instruction is a conclusion of law.

Carpet Barn v. State of

Utah, 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

A trial court's

legal conclusion is not accorded any particular deference and is
reviewed for its correctness.

City of Monticello v. Christensen,

788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990).
2.

Was defendant adequately represented at trial in

accord with his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel?

Review of this issue is based on a determination of

whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, whether
the deficient performance prejudiced defendant.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d
401, 405 (Utah 1986).
3.

Was the prosecutor's discussion of the evidence and

inferences therefrom in closing argument proper?

In reviewing an

allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court must determine
whether the prosecutor's remarks called the attention of the jury
to matters "they would not be justified in considering in
reaching the verdict and, if so, whether there is a reasonable
likelihood" that the remarks "so prejudiced the jury that there
would have been a more favorable result absent the misconduct."
State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988); State v. Tillman,
750 P.2d 546, 559-61 (Utah 1987).

In determining whether a

remark is prejudicial the alleged misconduct must be viewed in
light of the totality of the trial and the trial court's ruling
on this matter will not be overturned absent an abuse of
discretion.
4.

Speer, 750 P.2d at 190.
Did defendant fail to preserve his allegation of

improper juror witness contact by failing to object to the
alleged contact when he became aware of it during the course of
trial?

The Utah Supreme Court has held that "invited error [] is

procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor, especially
where ample opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a result.
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (citing State v. Tillman,
750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987).
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Notwithstanding defendant's apparent waiver, assuming
this Court considers defendant's allegations of impropriety, was
the incidental and inconsequential juror witness contact
sufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice?

A rebuttable

presumption of prejudice arises from unauthorized contact between
jurors and trial witnesses and/or court personnel which goes
beyond "a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact."
v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985);

State

State v, Jonas, 793 P.2d

902, 908 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah
1990).
5.

Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to

sustain defendant's conviction for the lesser included offense of
manslaughter?

The power of this Court to review a jury verdict

challenged on the sufficiency of the evidence is "quite limited."
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

The

evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it, must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.

State v.

Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct.
1837 (1990).

Where the defendant has failed to marshal all the

evidence in support of the jury's verdict and then demonstrate
that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the verdict,
the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, this Court
may properly decline to consider the sufficiency of the evidence
adduced.

State v. Moore, 802 P.2d at 738-39 (Utah Ct. App.

1990).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Lew Day, was charged with one count of
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at
1).

On March 30, 1990, defendant was convicted by a jury of the

lesser included offense of manslaughter, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990) (R. at 195).
Defendant was sentenced May 3, 1990, to the indeterminate term of
not less than one year nor more than 15 years with credit for
time served (R. at 243). In addition, defendant's sentence was
enhanced by one year for use of a firearm (R. at 243).
Defendant subsequently filed a motion for new trial on
May 23, 1990 alleging, among other things:

improper juror

witness contact; new exculpatory evidence (R. at 246-52).

The

trial court denied defendant's motion in a memorandum decision on
August 16, 1990 on the ground that defendant was unable to "point
to clear definitive evidence. . . . "

The trial court stated that

"proper investigatory work" had been conducted and defendant's

Defendant was represented by Marcus Taylor and David Blackwell
at trial. Shortly after filing the motion for new trial, Taylor
filed a motion to withdraw as counsel (R. at 293, 314). In an
order issued June 13, 1990, the trial court granted Taylor's
request to withdraw and appointed James L. Shumate to represent
defendant (R. at 304). Shumate subsequently filed a memorandum
in support of a previous motion that Taylor had filed requesting
the appointment of an investigator and, in addition, requested a
hearing on the new trial motion (R. at 323-43). The trial court
denied the motions in a memorandum decision (R. at 398-424).
-4-

alleged grounds for a new li±uJ U - I U L U H J i<>
evidence'

" nwly discovered

new exculpatory evidence' have been examined and
, much of what has been proffered i s not •

newly-discovered evidence" (R. at 4I'll, 4 l\ ) .
The trial court similarly denied defendant's claims
concerr

; :«

t

D

f

^ grounds that the limited

contact between juror Grover Smith .a

:

< -

deputy Robert Nalwalker, was "authorized by the Court"
\ *>

not relate j<» t. |M 11
"involve discussion

a

,
,

"did

*; * iid ^t

v . personal or private ^aii-, ^ . . . .

such that xu would breed a sense of familiarity" (R. 416-1 8; a
copy of the trial cuuil *s Kumar (avium

Decision In Re Post-Trial

Motions is attached hereto as Addendum A ) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the morning of August 9

19i|ll, 1 »"w i«- ":'iuiweeks and

David Kile, the victim in this case, finished loading a truck for
then

"iii|]!MyHi ,•! * In1 Vidrine Sawmill in Escalante, Utah, before

taking the rest of the day off to drive l. o Ci rclevl! le

in ah in

Sudweeks's pickup truck (Transcript of jury trial, March 28 ( 1989
[here.

."v

November

Transcript

>f preliminary hearing,

?r - [hereinaiu :

{ v x, .::; • , • :

Circleville later that evening, Sudweeks ^..\
I
spent the night

, diL^JL having
-

;ie vn-*,t *

* <-

t evv :rinks," they

^hp next morn.

Sudweeks drank some beer while Kile
vodka before

: J Wiltshire drank some
~ t . <k and drove *•> -t

local C-Mart where Wiltshire purchased "»i cold pad' ml been "" (T.

-5-

at 470, 467). After leaving C-Mart the three friends stopped at
Larry's Service Station in Circleville to talk to the defendant,
Lew Day (T. at 470). Defendant then joined Sudweeks, Kile and
Wiltshire and the four men decided to go "riding around" (T. at
470).

Sudweeks and Kile waited at the service station for

Wiltshire to drive his truck home and return with defendant in
his truck to pick them up (T. at 470). With defendant behind the
wheel, the four men decided to drive to Junction, Utah, where
they purchased more beer and gas for defendant's truck (T. at
2
471).

The foursome then headed north toward Piute Reservoir

near Marysvale, Utah, continuing to drink along the way (T. at
471-472).
The men stopped up Bullion Canyon, just outside
Marysvale, to drink some more beer and talk about hunting and
fishing (T. at 472). Defendant expressed a desire to "ride up
over the top of the mountain" until Sudweeks told him that he
(Sudweeks) and Kile had to be back to work in Escalante the next
morning (T. at 472-473).

Approximately one hour passed before

the men drove back to Marysvale to purchase more liquor (T. at
3
473, 505). After leaving the liquor store defendant drove to a
bar at the south end of Marysvale where the four men did some
more drinking and shot pool for approximately one hour (T. at

Defendant occupied the driver's side of the truck with Sudweeks
seated next to him, then Kile and Wiltshire by the passenger door
(T. at 471).
3
Cleora Petersen, who runs the Marysvale liquor store, testified
that Wiltshire purchased 2 liters of Canadian Host and one / half
gallon of vodka, as well as another liquor she could not recall,
at approximately 1:00 p.m. on August 10, 1989 (T. at 636-639).
-6-

473-74, 5 0 8 ) ,

The men then drove

-' .n end
in%

.

of Marysvale where they did more drinking and shot more pool
,j| 4". I) ""' Atl'.ei" Ipavinf) Sue' F Bax at

approximately

defendant apparently drove south east ni

^

f J, ,

-

I

Thompsonville Road (T. at 47 5) ' As they drove slowly southward
I in IIN1

along Tl lompsoi ivi lie

f

;.«id drinking and talking,

stopping approximately three different times to uriridLe ('
476-78).
The : . :• ;

•

north of a gate leading *
i

Thompsonville Road

,

ijiatc <"i fourth time just

;he Henrie property on the east side
>

copy of State's Exhibit #6

depicting the scene oi tin- slto* 1 i n«) i* jltd-'b I hor^-io as
Addendum E"

Defendant got out of the truck first and said "Wait

.i minute," -if' '1P reached in and removed - ,22 caliber rifle and a
.270 caliber rifle from a gun racK LII
the other men could exit the vehicle .
defendant removed his

at i :)f h i s • tin: iick before
at 18:5-187, 478)

After

Sudweeks y ^ t out followed by Kile

Sudweeks estimated that they had each had approximately five to
eight beers apiece before even entering the bar (T at 5 0 8 ) ,
5
Emma Sue Tiller, who runs Sue's Bar, testified that defendant,
Sudweeks, Kile and Wiltshire arrived at the bar between 3:30 p.m.
and 4:00 p.m. (T. at 6 0 7 ) . She further testified that in her
opinion Wiltshire was "drunk," and "Kile and Lewis Sudweeks were
well on their way. And of the three, Lew Day was the soberest"
(T. at 6 0 8 ) . In response to the prosecutor's question asking
whether she had observed any argument between the m e n , Tiller
related an incident between Kile and Wiltshire (T. at 6 0 8 ) .
Apparently Kile attempted to take a drink of Wiltshire's whiskey
and Wiltshire told him to ask first (T. at 6 0 8 ) . Defendant went
over to talk to the two m e n , after which they appeared to
"mellow" (T. at 608 r 642, 647, 6 5 0 ) .
Although Sudweeks testifed that defendant headed south east out
of Marysvale after leaving Sue's Bar, several of the bar patrons
who observed the men that evening testifed that they watched
defendant's truck head west (T at 643, 648, 6 5 1 ) .
n

(T. at 478).

Wiltshire, who had apparently passed out, remained

seated next to the passenger door of defendant's truck (T. at
158, 252, 478). Defendant stood in front of the truck holding
both of his rifles while Kile apparently walked southeast away
from the truck toward the Henrie gate to urinate (T. at 478,
481).

Sudweeks urinated while standing behind the open driver's

side door of defendant's truck (T. at 478, 484). From that
vantage point, Sudweeks observed defendant make a comment to
Kile, who had his back to defendant, and then point the .22
caliber rifle and shoot Kile in the head (T. at 482). Although
Sudweeks heard two shots fired he was not sure whether Kile fell
after the first or second shot (T. at 483).
After shooting Kile, defendant stated, "I'll have all
you bastards in a pile before the night's over," as he began
walking north toward his truck and Sudweeks (T. at 483-485, 54748).

Sudweeks slipped back behind the truck and squatted down

(T. at 486-89).

When defendant stooped over in the cab of the

truck, apparently reaching for something on the floor boards,
Sudweeks ran southwest away from the truck toward US-89 and up a
steep bank which dropped off farther south near the Morrill ranch
house (T. at 486-89).

Sudweeks heard gunshots as he ran away

from the truck and gravel "flew up" under his feet (T. at 494).
Just as the sun was going down on the evening of August
10, 1989, Harold Morrill observed Sudweeks approach his house
from a kitchen window and stepped outside on the porch to see
what was going on (T. at 616). Sudweeks, who was winded from his
run up the bank, had slowed to a walk by the time he reached the

-8-

ML.)i J J i in noun1 mi

lit h\/).

Sudweeks sat down on the Morrill

porch and told Harold that defendant n-m
been shooting -•*!•-

N i p p e d mi

, 489-90; 616

iMM I Hi

:-en asked for Dale

Morril.

When Harold told

Sudweeks that n::- father w a s 'uf
asked Harolc * ^ go back *

moving sprinklers"

* r*e truck with '

defendant {'

Sudweeks

\o talk to

dr.-1-ned. explaining that he

couldn't lea-*j ' \> :hildre3
Harold that he

iudweek

- going back to make sure that [he] had seen

what [he] seen"

*(^i-

:-L l e

n Harold that he

thought Kile had been shot at that time because he "wanted
make sure he knew what he was talking about" I at 2~_ 8 After
Harold went back inside

Sudweeks

apparently remained sitting on the porch for a short while before
wal .» . > *
climbing back

m e that leads
.. : .t

near Henrie's gate

f

the Morrill home and
vim1 of t he shooting

;
-91-92, 6 2 3 ) .

As IK I * . ; tuwdid Henrie's gate from the top - ••
embankment near the Morrill home, Sudweeks saw KLle "si <

ivuig

j_n the road," and observed that Kile's feet appeared to be
7
Harold testified that Sudweeks wab ^ux^x holding a beer as he
approached the house and that he sat on the porch sipping the
beer as he told Harold about defendant (T. at 617-620). Sudweeks
testified that h e w a s unable to recall having had a beer in his
hand when he first talked to Harold that evening (T. at 5 2 9 ) .
8
Harold testified that although lie had asked Sudweeks to come
inside, Sudweeks declined saying he would wait on the steps (T.
at 6 1 7 ) . Harold also testified that after Sudweeks told him that
defendant had been shooting at him, he asked for a ride home, as
well as for Harold to go back with him to the truck to talk to
defendant (T. at 6 1 6 ) . Harold did not hear any shots that
evening (T. at 6 2 0 ) ,
-9-

"shaking," and "kicking" (T. at 493).

Sudweeks then ran back to

the Morrill's, stumbling down the embankment in his haste (T. at
493).

Without knocking, Sudweeks burst inside the Morrill home,

knocking the door off its hinges as he entered (T. at 494, 61819, 629). Dale Morrill had just returned form changing
sprinklers when Sudweeks burst through the door to his home and
told him to "get in touch with the Sheriff" (T. at 494, 629). 9
At the time he burst through the door Sudweeks appeared "really
scared" and "hysterical" (T. at 618-19, 630). It took Dale and
Harold approximately five minutes to calm Sudweeks down so that
they could understand him (T. at 630). Apparently Sudweeks did
not tell Dale that he thought defendant had shot Kile until
things had calmed down a little later in the evening, after the
ambulance had arrived, and he was waiting for his brother to come
and get him (T. 631). Like his son Harold, Dale Morrill did not
hear any of the shots fired that night (T. at 632).
Piute County Sheriff Brent Gottfredson arrived at the
Morrill home shortly after 9:00 p.m. that evening in response to
information that there had been a shooting nearby (T. at 141,
150).

After talking to Sudweeks and the Morrills, Sheriff

Harold was not sure how long Sudweeks was gone from the porch
before he burst through the door that evening (T. 618-23). After
speaking briefly with Sudweeks, Harold went inside the house to
retrieve his daughter from the bathtub; when he came back
outside, Sudweeks was gone (T. at 618). Harold testified that
his father, Dale Morrill, arrived home approximately 10-15
minutes after that (T. at 618). He had just started telling his
father about Sudweeks first visit when Sudweeks burst through the
door (T. at 618). During cross-examination, Harold said that it
was possible that Sudweeks could have been gone for approximately
20 to 30 minutes (T. at 620). Sudweeks testified that he was
gone less than 10 minutes (T. at 559).
-10-

Gottfredson headed i

.waul Ihr Kcnrji' gat

the shooting (

t c investigate

Stopping his vehicle approximately

I wet. south of

40

Sheriff Gottfredson approached the

scene and noticed that the driver's side docm

1 cleft»iidant "'i.

truck was open and that Wiltshire, who appeared to be

u n c o J i s c 1111 J s , A1 r i".

i

i i 1 i 1111 i n i : i 11 * - ( r • a t 1 b 8 , 1 h i, 2 5 2 ) .

Determining that Kile w as s ti 1 ] al i ve, Sheri i I (;# >1 t 1 i #*ch n v,iilmj
for an ambulance and began administering first did ("I, nt 158ie and Wiltshire, Sheriff
Gottfredson began to search the surrounding area t m

evidence iT

at 159, 2 1 7 ) .
A. |i(H t ( f Ii in i \\vr- si iqat inii that evening, Sheriff
Gottfredson checked the location of defendant's truck by
measuring the distance between Kile's body and the truck and
noting its relatione ,j
161),

As he began u

discovered tw « :>

•-* •

i. at

•.*:** around the area, Sheriff Gottfredson

22 caliber brass casings that evening, one

approximately 1 8 inches noi t i"« <«I 1 he him MI ^|>« >i 1 H 1 i by F i 1 *:•» * s
head and another one approximately four inches south of the blood

Kile's body was found lying approximately 23 feet from
defendant's truck which was parked on the east side of
Thompsonville Road facing south (T. at 162, 169, 263-64).
Blood
from Kile's head wound left a stain approximately 10 feet west of
the north post of Henrie's gate (T. at 161, 263-64). A urine
stain was observed on the ground near the driver's side door of
defendant's truck (T. at 2 7 1 ) .
Defense witness Paul Hampton, the wrecker operator who towed
defendant's truck from the scene, testified that State's Exhibit
2, a drawing of the scene used to facilitate testimony, did not
comport with his memory of the positioning of defendant's truck
which he believed was a little further south than it appeared on
the exhibit (T. at 720-723
The State conceded that the exhibit
7 2
was not drawn, to seal e (T
7).

spot (T. at 163).

Sheriff Gottfredson marked the location of

the shell casings he discovered that night by drawing an X in the
dirt with his foot (T. at 266). Although the area around the
Morrill ranch house and Henrie's gate apparently experienced a
light rain the night of the shooting, those marks were still
present the next morning, August 11, 1989, when Sheriff
Gottfredson returned to the scene to continue his investigation
and make more precise measurements (T. at 266; P.H. at 29).
Approximately, four officer's assisted in the
investigation and search for defendant that evening (T. at 218).
Sheriff Gottfredson told the officers assisting him in the
investigation to keep the general public away from the scene and
road blocks were set up in Garfield County at the junction of US89 and highway 20 in Marysvale (T. at 258, 324). Deputy Robert
Nalwalker patrolled an area west and north of the shooting
including US-89 (T. at 302-304).

At approximately 2:00 a.m. on

the morning of August 11, 1989, Deputy Nalwalker was headed south
on Thompsonville Road approximately 50 yards north of Henrie's
William Albrecht, Jr., a specialist in firearms identification
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testifed that the
.22 caliber brass casings discovered by Sheriff Gottfredson were
fired from defendant's .22 caliber rifle (T. at 370-75). Sheriff
Gottfredson located three other rounds west of the south post of
Henrie's gate, approximately 13-14 feet from the blood spot (T.
at 168). Albrecht testified that although these three rounds had
all come from the same gun, they had not come from defendant's
.22 caliber rifle (T. at 370).
Deputy William L. Brewer of the Sevier County Sheriff's Office
assisted in the investigation of the shooting the night of August
10, 1989, and he also discovered two .22 caliber shell casings
approximately 10-15 feet west and a little south of the blood
spot (T. at 202). Albrecht testified that the casings were the
same as those discovered by Sheriff Gottfredson and had also been
fired by defendant's .22 caliber rifle (T. at 375).
-12-
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Thompsonville Road (T.

12
While Deputy Nalwalker had been using his search light to
search the adjacent sagebrush and low hills earlier, he had
turned it off a short while before hearing the yell (T. at 304).
At the time he heard the yell no police identification lights
were operating (T. at 304).
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at 312). There the searchers picked up a track approximately 15
to 100 yards from the scene of the shooting, which appeared to be
heading in a northwesterly direction away from Thompsonville Road
(T. at 173, 312). The track, which appeared to have been made by
a small pair of western cowboy boots eventually led the searchers
to the crest of a small hill overlooking the scene of the
shooting where they discovered defendant's rifles, a pack of
Marlboro cigarette's of the type defendant smoked, a Marlboro
cigarette butt and defendant's lighter (T. at 174-87, 234, 285,
314-316, 438-39).

After a comparison of the boots defendant was

wearing at the time of his arrest with the tracks they had
discovered that morning, the searchers determined that the tracks
13
had been made by defendant's boots (T. at 174-75, 315).
The bullet fragments subsequently removed from Kile's
head were sent to the FBI for analysis and determined to be brass
coated .22 caliber fragments that were consistent with having
been fired from defendant's .22 caliber rifle1

(T. 386-88).

After a metal elements analysis it was determined that the bullet
fragments removed from defendant's head were composed of elements
Approximately five months after the shooting Deputy Nalwalker
examined two pairs of Sudweeks's work boots and determined that
they were not consistent with the tracks he had followed the
morning of August 11, 1989 (T. at 319, 458-69). Deputy Nalwalker
also examined four pairs of boots which Sudweeks rarely wore and
kept at his family homestead in Kingston, Utah, and determined
they were also inconsistent with the tracks followed the morning
of August 11, 1989 (T. at 256, 356-7, 550).
14
Although defendant's .22 caliber rifle arrived intact for
analysis at FBI headquarters in Washington D.C., the gun stock
was apparently damaged in the mail on its way back to the Salt
Lake County Sheriff's Department from FBI headquarters (T. at
177-79). The FBI encountered no difficulties in conducting tests
on defendant's .22 caliber rifle (T. at 177-79; 370-75).
-14-
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brief, as pertinent to specific arguments.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant

w i equeFd:ed

instruction on the additional lesser included offense of
negligent homicide

Defendant was not entitled to have the jury

instructed regarding negligent homicide because he IM.S not Mini
cannot indicate a rational basi ; i-i the evidence upon which the
jury < i

. :

i . •

of second degree murder ^ o

a aim of both the charged offense

..).*• lesser included of tense of

manslaughter on which they were properly instructed

Although

evideri ;e of del eiiduii 1 ', v. Iiiiitiuy i nloxication was admissable to
negate the mens rea of murder L\\ the second degree, the jury
could not properly rely

> negate the culpable mental state

of either recklessness <-.,. ,-, ,y i * yt:noe.

"I'lius , although the jnry

acquitted defendant of second degree murder because of
intoxication,

could not have similarly acquitted defendant of

the lesser i m . :.:<•: diense nl teokJi^oi mans 1 nughter.

Defendant

presented no additional evidence to suggest that he was otherwise
unaware of the risk of death from mishandling and/or firing a .22
caliber ri fie.
Defendant was not denied his sixth amendment right to
l he cl f eet, i vf» assistance of counsel.
myriad of possibilities a& to \

Although defendant raises a

, ,

done, he asserts that defense counsel's performance was
ineffective with absolutely no discussion of the defense actually
presented on his behalf, or how that defense, even assuming it
was deficient, was also prejudicial.
Defendant's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in
closing argument are similarly unsupported by a careful review of
the record.

As a general rule, counsel for each side has

considerable latitude in commenting on the evidence and the
inferences and deductions arising therefrom in closing argument.
The prosecutor's closing argument in this case was properly
within this latitude and defendant has failed to demonstirate that
the prosecutor called the attention of the jurors to matters
outside the record, nor has he demonstrated that the alleged
misstatements so prejudiced the jury that there was a strong
likelihood of a more favorable result absent the prosecutor's
remarks.
Defendant's allegation of improper juror witness
contact has not been preserved for review by this Court.

Because

defense counsel was aware of the alleged improper contact during
trial and took no action to challenge the alleged impropriety at
that time, this Court may properly decline to review defendant's
allegation on the ground of waiver.

Even assuming this Court

determines to look past defendant's waiver, the brief contact
between Deputy Nalwalker and juror Smith did not amount to an
improper "conversational contact," nor was it sufficient to breed
an improper "sense of familiarity."

Rather it was an incidental

and inconsequential contact insufficient to raise a presumption
of prejudice.
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Finally, the evidence is sufficient to sustain
defendant's conviction for the lesser included offense of
manslaughter.

Although defendant asserts that introduction of

additional evidence might possibly have implicated someone else
as the shooter, he has wholly failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the jury's verdict and then demonstrate that even
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
the evidence is insufficient to support it.

Therefore, this

Court need not and should not consider defendant's challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence against him.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.
Defendant asserts that because the jury convicted him
of the lesser included offense of manslaughter instead of murder
in the second degree, "it is easy to see that [he] could have
been convicted on the lesser-included offense of [n]egligent
[hjomicide if the jury had been so instructed."

In support of

his assertion defendant merely notes that the "evidence in the
case was clear that [he] was highly intoxicated at the time."
(Br. of App. at 4).

Defendant's minimal and conclusory analysis

in support of his argument does not merit review by this Court.
State v. Amicone# 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v.
Sterger, No. 900078-CA slip op. at 4 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. March 6,
1991) (court declined to rule on defendant's arguments due in
part to his failure to provide any meaningful analysis).

-17-

Should

this Court determine that defendant's conclusory assertions merit
review, the trial court's denial of defendant's requested
instruction on negligent homicide was proper. 15
In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court set out an evidence-based standard for determining
whether to instruct a jury regarding a lesser included offense at
the defendant's request.

Ld. at 157. The Court determined that

a defendant's requested lesser included instruction must be given
if (1) the statutory elements of greater and lesser included
offenses overlap to some degree, and (2) the evidence provides a
"rational basis" for acquitting the defendant of the charged
offense and convicting him of the included offense.

Jki. at 158-

59; State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266-67 (Utah 1988).
also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1990).16

See

Applying the Baker

standard to the facts of this case, defendant was not entitled to
At the outset of the State's analysis it is helpful to clarify
the proceedings below. Defendant initially requested that the
trial court instruct the jury solely on the offense charged,
murder in the second degree, and that the trial court not
instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter
(T. 817-18). In the event the trial court denied his request,
defendant made an alternative request that the jury be allowed to
consider not only the lesser included offense of manslaughter,
but the lesser included offense of negligient homicide as well
(T. at 818). The trial court subsequently instructed the jury as
to the elements of murder in the second degree and manslaughter,
but declined to give a negligent homicide instruction on the
ground that there was no evidence to support the giving of such
an instruction (T. at 820).
16

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) provides:
The court shall not be obligated to charge
the jury with respect to an included offense
unless there is a rational basis for a
verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense.
_1 Q _

have the jury instructed on the additional lesser included
offense of negligent homicide. Admittedly, murder in the second
degree, manslaughter and negligent homicide stand in a greater
and lesser included offense relationship, State v. Crick, 675
P.2d 527, 529-30 (Utah 1983); however, the evidence of
intoxication presented at trial provided a rational basis for
acquitting defendant solely of the charged offense of second
degree murder.

Defendant has not and cannot indicate a rational

basis in the evidence upon which the jury could have legally
acquitted him of the included offense of manslaughter and
convicted him of the additional lesser included offense of
negligent homicide.
At trial, the State presented evidence that defendant
deliberately pointed a .22 caliber rifle at the victim's head and
fired approximately two shots, one of which was fatal (T. at 47884).

After shooting the victim, defendant turned toward the

State's witness, Lewis Sudweeks, and stated, "I'll have all you
bastards in a pile before the night's over" (T. at 483-85, 54748).

This evidence demonstrates defendant's knowledge of the

risk of death, if not an actual intent to kill.

See Standiford,

769 P.2d at 254 (noting that 107 stab wounds indicated at least a
knowledge of the risk of death). 17
As part of his defense to the charge of second degree
murder, defendant presented evidence of his intoxication the
night of the shooting which resulted in an alleged "alcohol
17
The jury was properly instructed on the elements of both
murder in the second degree and reckless manslaughter (see Jury
Instructions # 11, 17, 18).
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blackout" (T. at 672). During closing argument, defense counsel
argued that defendant's intoxication was a factor for the jury to
consider in deciding between second degree murder and
manslaughter (Transcript of closing argument, March 30, 1990
[hereinafter C.A.] at 41-42), 18 Although defendant also attacked
Sudweeks's credibility and the quality of the police
investigation, he presented no additional evidence to suggest
that he was unaware of the risk of death from mishandling and/or
firing a .22 caliber rifle.
As previously noted, voluntary intoxication may negate
the mens rea of murder in the second degree; however, it does not
negate the culpable mental state of either recklessness or
negligence.

Standiford, 769 P.2d at 265 (citing Utah Code Ann. §

76-2-306 (1990)).19

"[I]ntoxication, even when sufficient to

negate a culpable mental state, does not absolve a person from
all criminal liability."

Id. at 266.

Thus, although the jury

acquitted defendant of second degree murder because of
intoxication, it could not have similarly acquitted defendant of
the lesser included offense of manslaughter for which the
18
The jury was properly instructed concerning evidence of
defendant's intoxication (see Jury Instruction # 19).
19
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 provides:
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense
to a criminal charge unless such intoxication
negates the existence of the mental state
which is an element of the offense; however,
if recklessness or criminal negligence
establishes an element of an offense and the
actor is unaware of the risk because of
voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is
immaterial in a prosecution for that offense.
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culpable mental state is recklessness.

State v. Royballf 710

P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1985) (voluntary intoxication does not
absolve a defendant of criminal responsibility for reckless
criminal acts); State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985)
(where the requisite mens rea of the manslaughter charge is
recklessness, court held that evidence of defendant's alcoholic
blackout was immaterial).

Defendant presented no additional

evidence to demonstrate that he was somehow unaware of the risk
of death from mishandling a .22 caliber rifle.

Thus, in light of

section 76-2-306, defendant has not demonstrated a rational basis
in the evidence upon which the jury could have legitimately
acquitted him of the included offense of manslaughter.
Therefore, defendant cannot meet the second prong of the Baker
standard and the trial court properly denied his requested
negligent homicide instruction.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL.
Defendant, who was charged with the offense of second
degree murder and ultimately found guilty of the lesser included
offense of manslaughter, appears to assert that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel at trial because his trial
counsel failed to; (1) conduct an adequate investigation to
20
The trial court's manslaughter instructions borrowed the
statutory language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990):
Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if
the actor recklessly causes the death of
another.
(Jury Instructions #11, 18).
-21-

determine whether defendant was a secretor and to attack the
State's failure to have the State's witness, Lewis Sudweeks,
similarly tested; (2) attack an alleged inconsistency between the
State's theory of the case as presented at the preliminary
hearing and the theory ultimately presented at trial; (3)
adequately impeach Sudweeks's testimony; (4) point out that an
alleged "substantial" rainstorm "may have obliterated" evidence
and (5) call certain witnesses who may have testified regarding
defendant's "positive mental attitude" the day of the shooting
(Br. of App. at 5-13)•

Defendant levels these allegations with

absolutely no discussion of the defense actually presented by
trial counsel or how that defense was either deficient or
prejudicial.
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must show both that counsel rendered a
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that a
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's deficient
performance, the result of the trial would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Carter,
776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405
(Utah 1986).

A "[d]efendant must prove that specific, identified

acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance.

The claim may not be speculative, but must

be a demonstrative realityf.]"

Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. And, the

deficient performance must be so prejudicial as to "to undermine
confidence in the reliability of the verdict."

-22-

Id.

Here, defendant fails to meet either the deficient
performance prong or the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.
As to his claim regarding counsel's failure to determine whether
or not he was a secretor and to attack the State's failure to
have Sudweeks similarly tested, defendant fails to identify how
counsel's conduct was deficient, nor does he articulate how it
was prejudicial beyond his speculative, unsupported assertion
that it was a "crucial fact" that "could have been pointed out to
the jury in order to separate" him "from the site where the
rifles were recovered."

Defendant further asserts that "[i]f Mr.

Sudweeks was tested for secretor status, the results could have
established substantial reasonable doubt in this case" (Br. of
App. at 8). 21 Even assuming defense counsel could have
introduced evidence that defendant was a secretor, it cannot
reasonably be argued that defendant's case was prejudiced as a
22
result.

The jury was presented with additional, significant

and substantial evidence connecting defendant to his discarded
rifles which were discovered by following a track determined to
Defendant speculates that because 85% "of the male population
of the United States has a physiological characteristic of being
a secretor," and because "no ABO antigen activity was present on
the cigarette" butt found near defendant's rifles, his trial
counsel may have been able to show that defendant had not smoked
the cigarette butt, if defendant had been tested, and found to be
a secretor.
22
Defendant vaguely asserts that his trial counsel did not
inform him of the "cigarette butt analysis" or other "forensic
reports." Notwithstanding the fact that there is no record
support for defendant's assertion, he fails to identify how
counsel's performance was deficient, and does not articulate how
it was prejudicial beyond speculating that had the information
been shared, "the trial outcome would likely have been different"
(Br. of App. at 11).
-23-

have been made by defendant's boots to the crest of a small hill
overlooking the scene where searchers also discovered defendant's
cigarette lighter and a pack of Marlboro cigarettes of the type
defendant smoked (T. at 174-87, 234, 285, 314-16, 438-39).
Defendant next asserts that the State's theory of the
case as presented at the preliminary hearing differed from the
theory ultimately presented at trial (Br. of App. at 8-11).

As

before, defendant fails to identify how this alleged
inconsistency rendered his trial counsel's performance deficient,
nor does he articulate how it was prejudicial beyond making
wholly speculative and unsupported assertions (Br. of App. at 910).

In support of his argument defendant relies solely on two

completely unsubstantiated sketches of the "preliminary hearing
scenario" and the "trial scenario" as viewed by defendant's wife
which, although attached to his brief, are not part of the record
on appeal.

It is well settled that this Court cannot consider

matters outside of the record.

State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297

(Utah 1986); State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984).
According to defendant, the State's theory at the
preliminary hearing was that the victim had been shot "from some
short distance from his body and that two .22 caliber casings,
also found a short distance from Mr. Kile's body, were most
likely the casings connected to the fatal shot" (Br. of App. at
8).

At trial, defendant asserts the "State changed its theory by

moving the truck and relying on the second pair of cartridges as
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having been connected to the fatal shot" (Br. of App. at 9).
Contrary to defendant's apparent assertion, at no time, either at
the preliminary hearing or at trial, was the State's theory of
defendant's guilt tied to the location of any particular .22
caliber shell casing relative to the location of the victim's
body (P.H. at 34-37A and T. 163-68, 201-08).

Moreover, neither

the preliminary hearing transcript nor the trial transcript
support defendant's allegations which appear to wholly ignore the
testimony of the State Medical Examiner, Dr. Grey, who testified
at both the preliminary hearing and at trial that the fatal shot
could not have been fired at close range (P.H. at 57; T. at 567).
Nonetheless, defendant asserts that while the .22
caliber shell casings discovered by Deputy Brewer approximately
10 to 15 feet away from the victim may have been consistent with
Dr. Grey's findings, they are inconsistent with the pictures
drawn by his wife (Br. of App. at 10).

Relying solely on these

wholly speculative and unsubstantiated sketches depicting the
preliminary hearing and trial as viewed by his wife, defendant
asserts that "it becomes almost certain that these 'second'
casings represent the fatal shot or shots" and that Sudweeks
"implicated himself at the preliminary hearing because he did not
know of the FBI test results on the 'second' pair of casings. By

The "second pair of cartridges" referred to by defendant
appear to be the two .22 caliber shell casings discovered by
Deputy Brewer the night of the shooting approximately ten to 15
feet south and west of the bloodstain created by the victim's
head wound. Although these particular casings had not been
analyzed by the FBI prior to the preliminary hearing, they had
been analyzed by the time of trial and were determined to have
been fired from defendant's .22 caliber rifle.
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the time of trial, Sudweeks had to move the truck to continue to
shift the blame to the Defendant, and he did" (Br. of App. at
10). 24 Although defendant attempts to support his allegations by
attacking the consistency of Sudweeks's testimony between the
preliminary hearing and trial, he fails to cite to any specific
instance of Sudweeks's inconsistency (with reference to the
location of the truck or the parties involved) in the record,
which wholly fails to support his allegations.25 Defendant's
Totally lacking in record support for his claims, defendant
asserts that Sudweeks "told two substantially different versions
of the facts, [taking] advantage of the tie between the .22
caliber rifle and both pairs of shell casings" (Br. of App. at
9). According to defendant, Sudweeks's alleged inconsistency is
of "vital importance" to his case because "Dr. Gr[e]y, the
medical examiner[,] who did not testify at the preliminary
hearing, testified at trial that the fatal shot had come from
more than three feet away" from the victim's body (Br. of App. at
9). However, as previously noted, and contrary to defendant's
assertions, Dr. Grey did testify at the preliminary hearing and
his testimony there was entirely consistent with his testimony
at trial (P.H. at 51-70; T. at 565-94). At both proceedings Dr.
Grey testified that the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the
head (P.H. at 59; T. at 568). He further testified that it was
not possible to determine the exact range from which the fatal
shot was fired, which could have been fired from anywhere within
an indeterminate range of from 5 to 50 feet, but not less than
three feet from the victim (P.H. at 57; T. at 567).
25
Defendant further asserts that his trial counsel failed to
preserve alleged inconsistencies in the State's theory through
diagrams, visual exhibits or verbal description which "made it
almost impossible to convincingly impeach" Sudweeks's testimony
implicating defendant as the shooter, or to "adequately describe
the prejudice suffered. . . ." (Br. of App. at 10-11). In
addition, defendant notes that his trial counsel did not obtain
any "expert testimony on forensic medicine to discuss the angles
of shots in view of the two inconsistent theories offered by the
State" (Br. of App. at 12). However, as previously noted,
defendant fails to point to any specific inconsistencies in the
record. Moreover, Sudweeks testified consistently both at the
preliminary hearing and at trial that he saw defendant shoot Kile
from his vantage point behind the driver's side door of
defendant's truck, that defendant was standing in front of the
truck, and that Kile was standing south and east of the truck,
near the Henrie gate (P.H. at 102-05, 139-49; T. at 478-82).
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speculative assertions together with his lack of record support
simply fail to demonstrate either deficient performance by his
trial counsel or prejudice to his defense.
Defendant further attacks the adequacy of his trial
counsel's impeachment of Sudweeks's testimony on the ground that
counsel "failed to adequately investigate the relationship
between David Kile, Bobby Cox, and Lewis Sudweeks," and therefore
"failed to point out an important motivation for Mr. Sudweeks
rather than Mr. Day to be the person to shoot David Kile" (Br. of
App. at 12).

Again, defendant's bald assertion is totally devoid

of record support.

Contrary to defendant's allegation, his trial

counsel fully investigated the alleged "affectionate"
relationship between the victim, David Kile, and Sudweeks's
apparent common law wife at the time of the shooting, Bobby Cox.
Kile's relationship with Cox was brought out during trial through
the testimony of defense witnesses, William L. Christiansen and
Lori Franklin, who testified that they had observed Cox and Kile
drinking together on several occasions (T. at 744-45, 766).
Franklin further testified that she had observed affectionate
acts between Cox and Kile including "kissing," "hugging," and
"putting their hand on each other's legs" (T. at 772-786).
Franklin also testified she had heard a conversation between Cox
and Sudweeks during which Sudweeks called Kile a "low life" and
stated "that somebody should give him a blanket party in the near
future" (T. at 766). Defendant does not suggest what further
investigation should or could have been conducted, nor does he
mention what, if any, additional evidence could have been
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presented.

In light of the above, defendant's frivolous and

unsupported allegations establish neither deficiency nor
prejudice and are without merit.
Relying on State v. Tempiin, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 14
(Utah 1990), defendant appears to further assert that his trial
counsel was ineffective for not calling certain witnesses to
testify at trial concerning his "positive mental state and good
attitude" the morning of the shooting (Br. of App. at 12).
However, there is simply no indication in the record that either
Peggy Palmer, Pat Yero or Jim Willis would have testified
concerning defendant's positive attitude the morning of August
10, 1989 had they been called at trial. Moreover, defendant has
not demonstrated how, in view of the overwhelming evidence
against him, testimony regarding his alleged positive attitude
would have had anything other than a negligible effect on the
jury.

Because defendant has not demonstrated either deficiency

or prejudice, his claim of ineffectiveness is without merit.

Id.

at 17 n.26 (defendant did not meet burden of demonstrating there
was a reasonable probability of a different result at trial where
he failed to provide reviewing court with any evidence concerning
what the witness would have testified to had he been called
during trial).
Finally, defendant asserts that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to elicit testimony concerning an alleged
rainstorm which "may have obliterated substantially important
evidence" (Br. of App. at 7, 12-13).

Again defendant's vague

assertion is wholly lacking in record support.
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Although evidence

of a light rain was presented at the preliminary hearing, there
is no indication in the record that any evidence was obliterated
26
as a result (P.H. at 29).
Because defendant has failed to
point to any specific, identified acts or omissions that fall
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance,
his allegations of ineffectiveness are without merit.
POINT III
THE PROSECUTOR PROPERLY DISCUSSED THE
EVIDENCE AND THE INFERENCES AND DEDUCTIONS
ARISING THEREFROM DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT.
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor misstated in
closing argument the actual time period that Harold Morrill
testified defendant was gone from his porch the night of the
shooting.

He further asserts that the prosecutor misstated in

closing argument that the State's witness, Lewis Sudweeks,
submitted to a blood alcohol test (Br. of App. at 13).

A careful

review of the record demonstrates that defendant's assertions of
prosecutorial misconduct are without merit.
In reviewing an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct,
this Court must determine whether the prosecutor's remarks called
the attention of the jury to matters "they would not be justified
in considering in reaching the verdict and, if so, whether there
is a reasonable likelihood" that the remarks "so prejudiced the
jury that there would have been a more favorable result absent
the misconduct."

State v. Speerf 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988);

26
Significantly, Sheriff Gottfredson testified that he marked
the location of shell casings discovered the night of the
shooting with his foot and that those markings still were present
when the investigation was continued the following morning (T. at
266).
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State v, Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 559-61 (Utah 1987).

In

determining whether a remark is prejudicial the alleged
misconduct must be viewed in light of the totality of the trial
and the trial court's ruling on this matter will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion.

Speer, 750 P.2d at

190.
As a general rulef counsel for each side has
considerable latitude and may discuss fully from their viewpoints
the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising therefrom
in closing argument.
omitted).

Tillman# 750 P.2d at 560 (citations

The prosecutor's closing argument in this case was

properly within this latitude and defendant has not demonstrated
that he called the attention of the jurors to matters outside the
recordf nor has defendant demonstrated that the alleged
misstatements so prejudiced the jury that there was a strong
likelihood of a more favorable result absent the prosecutor's
remarks. 27 During the course of closing argument, the prosecutor
27
Moreover, the jurors were instructed that argument by the
attorneys was not evidence in the case:
You must not consider as evidence, any
statement of counsel made during this trial;
however, if counsel for the parties stipulate
you will regard that fact as being
conclusively proved.
As to any question to which an objection was
sustained, you must not speculate as to what
the answer might have been or as to the
reason for the objection.
You must not consider any evidence that was
rejected or any evidence that was stricken.
A question is not evidence, and may be
considered only as it supplies meaning to the
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made the following observation concerning the testimony of Harold
Morrill:
Harold Morrill didn't testify that Lew Day
was gone 20 to 30 minutes. That's not a
correct statement of the evidence. What he
said was, "I left him (Sudweeks) on the
porch, went in and took care of my children.
When I came out, he was gone." He didn't
know if he (Sudweeks) left 30 seconds
before—
(C.A. at 78). At this point in the prosecutor's closing
argument, defense counsel objected, asserting that Harold Morrill
had actually testified that defendant was gone 20 to 30 minutes
(C.A. at 78). The trial court overruled defense counsel's
objection, stating that "[t]he jury heard the testimony[;] [t]hey
can rely on their joint memory" (C.A. at 79).

The prosecutor

then continued his argument as follows:
Harold Morrill talked about what he did. He
went in the bathroom, took care of his little
girl, got her out of the tub, put her pajamas
on, got the boy out, wrapped him in a towel,
and walked back out. That's all he said he
could remember doing.
He said, "I did not look at my clock. Any
estimate, any time I give is an estimate.
That's what I did. I don't know when
Sudweeks left. All I know is when I come
out, he was gone."
Now that could have been 30 seconds. It
could have been 5 minutes. The evidence
isn't clear on that. But it is clear that
when he came back, he was scared to death.
(C.A. at 79). Although defendant claims the prosecutor's
statements were erroneous, his assertion is not supported by a

Cont.

answer.

(Jury Instruction #5).
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review of Harold Morrill's testimony at trial (T. at 617-623; a
copy of Harold Morrill's testimony is attached hereto as Addendum
C).

Harold Morrill was not sure how long Sudweeks was gone from

his porch (T. at 618-23).

After speaking briefly with Sudweeks,

Harold went inside the Morrill home to retrieve his daughter from
the bathtub; when he came back outside, Sudweeks was gone. (T. at
618).

Approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, Harold's father,

Dale Morrill, arrived home and Harold began telling him about
Sudweeks's first visit (T. at 618). Shortly thereafter, Sudweeks
returned (T. at 618). On cross-examination, Harold agreed with
defense counsel that it was possible Sudweeks could have been
gone for approximately 20 to 30 minutes (T. at 620). However, at
no time did Harold Morrill emphatically state that he was certain
defendant was gone from the porch for 20 to 30 minutes and no
less; rather, that time period was merely a possibility.
Sudweeks testified that he was gone less than 10 minutes (T. at
559).

Based on the foregoing testimony, it cannot reasonably be

argued that the prosecutor misstated the evidence, specifically
the testimony of Harold Morrill.

Rather, the prosecutor's

comments amounted to nothing more than the wholly appropriate
drawing of inferences and deductions from ambiguous testimony.
Defendant's additional allegation of prosecutorial
misconduct is similarly unsupported by a careful review of the
record.

Defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly stated

that Lewis Sudweeks had been given a blood alcohol test, when in
fact he had not (Br. of App. at 13).

However, defendant failed

to object to this alleged misstatement at trial; therefore, he is
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barred from raising it on appeal.
1141, 1147 (Utah 1989).

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d

Assuming this Court decides to address

defendant's argument, the following analysis is provided by the
State.
The prosecutor stated in pertinent part as follows:
All the evidence in this case stacks the
intoxication level like this: Evan is the
most drunk, Lew Day is the least. All the
witnesses, all the tests, they wanted us to
test Evan Wiltshire. What would that change
in this case if Evan Wiltshire had been
tested and shown to have an obvious high high
level of intoxication?
If you test Lew—we tested Lew Sudweeks. Lew
Sudweeks had a high level of intoxication in
between Lew Day and Evan Wiltshire. Those
are smokescreens that will not help you in
your deliberation.
(C.A. at 80-81).

Although the prosecutor's observation was

clearly prefaced by an "If," the comment is admittedly ambiguous.
However, even assuming the prosecutor misstated the evidence, the
effect of a such a misstatement was likely negligible in view of
the overwhelming evidence that all four men had been drinking
heavily.

In any event, defendant has failed to demonstrate that

the prosecutor's remarks prejudiced him such that there was a
likelihood of a more favorable result.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATIONS OF IMPROPER
JUROR/WITNESS CONTACT HAVE NOT BEEN PRESERVED
FOR REVIEW BY THIS COURT; ALTERNATIVELY,
REVERSAL ON THAT GROUND IS NOT WARRANTED.
On appeal to this Court, defendant appears to assert
that there was improper contact between the State's witness,
Deputy Robert Nalwalker, who also assisted in the trial
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proceedings, and juror Grover Smith (Br. of App. at 14).
However, in denying defendant's motion for new trial, the trial
court expressly found that defense counsel had specifically
waived the issue of alleged improper juror/witness contact (R. at
416-18).
During a lunch recess in the course of defendant's
trial March 26-30, 1990, Deputy Nalwalker observed juror Smith
emerge from the men's restroom (R. at 264). Aware that the other
jurors had already been taken to lunch by court personnel, Deputy
Nalwalker approached Smith and asked him to wait, stating that he
would ask the judge what to do about Smith's being left behind
(R. at 264-265, 308). After consulting with the judge, Deputy
Nalwalker informed Smith that the judge had instructed him
(Nalwalker) and the county clerk (who was serving as bailiff) to
drive Smith to the cafe where the other jurors were eating (R. at
265, 308-09).

Deputy Nalwalker, the bailiff and juror Smith then

drove, "without conversing," approximately one or two miles to
Dayna's Cafe where Smith joined the other jurors (R. at 265; 30809; copies of affidavits filed by Deputy Nalwalker and Grover
Smith are attached hereto as Addendum D ) .
In support of defendant's motion for new trial filed
May 23, 1990, defense counsel, David Blackwell, filed an
affidavit with the trial court stating that he had observed two
conversations between juror Smith and Deputy Nalwalker during a
trial recess (R. at 258-59).

However, at a hearing on the matter

held June 7, 1990, defense counsel, Marcus Taylor, advised the
trial court that he and Blackwell had discussed the matter and
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decided not to raise any objection to the contact between Smith
and Nalwalker (R. at 416).

In a memorandum decision denying

defendant's new trial motion, the trial court expressly found
that the issue of alleged improper contact between Deputy
Nalwalker and Smith had been waived:
Defense counsel were aware of the contact in
question and made a decision not raise any
question in relation thereto. The Court
concludes this constituted a waiver. It
would not be appropriate for defense counsel
to invite error, albeit by silence, and then
to rely thereon. State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d
1275, 1285 (Utah 1989).
(R. at 416-18; see Addendum A ) . In State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d
1275 (Utah 1989), relied upon by the trial court, defense counsel
specifically waived any prejudice resulting from conversation
between a juror and a witness and then subsequently attempted to
assert that contact was prejudicial on appeal.

In determining

that the issue of alleged improper juror witness contact had been
"affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally" waived, the Utah
Supreme Court held that "'invited error' (if there were any) 'is
procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor, especially
where ample opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a
result'"

Id. at 1285 (citing Tillman, 750 P.2d at 560-61).

Similarly, because defendant's trial counsel were aware of the
contact between juror Smith and Deputy Nalwalker during trial and
took no action to challenge the alleged impropriety at that time,
this Court may properly decline to review defendant's allegation
of improper juror witness contact on the ground of waiver.
Notwithstanding defendant's apparent waiver, assuming
this Court determines to reach the merits of his allegation, the
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trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's
new trial motion and/or his request for an evidentiary hearing
because the brief contact between Deputy Nalwalker and juror
Smith was incidental and inconsequential, raising no presumption
op

of prejudice. °

State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 909 (Utah 1990).

Contrary to defendant's apparent assertion, the facts do not
present an improper "conversational contact[]" between a juror
and a trial witness or court personnel, ^d. Cf:. Logan City v.
Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (conversation between
bailiff and juror concerning the "sensitive subject of
sentencing" amounted to more than a brief, incidental contact,
triggering a presumption of prejudice and bailiff's testimony,
standing alone, was not sufficient to show that the jury had not
in fact been prejudiced).

In the present case, as in Jonas, "no

'conversation' took place, in the normal sense of an 'oral
exchange of sentiments, observations, opinions [or] ideas.'"
(citation omitted).

Id.

Deputy Nalwalker merely approached Smith and

asked him to wait while he inquired of the judge what to do about
the fact that court personnel had already taken the other jurors
Although the trial court considered the issue of alleged
improper juror witness contact waived, for the apparent purpose
of refuting the allegations of impropriety in defendant's new
trial motion, the trial court found that, assuming a presumption
was legitimately raised, the State adequately rebutted the
presumption with the filing of affidavits by Deputy Nalwalker and
juror Smith explaining the incidental and inconsequential nature
of the contact (R. at 416-18). It is the State's position that
it was not necessary for the trial court to assume that a
presumption of prejudice was raised in denying defendant's
motion. As discussed with greater detail in the body of this
point, the contact between Deputy Nalwalker and juror Smith was
simply not an improper "conversational contact" sufficient to
raise a presumption of prejudice.
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to lunch.

Thus, although Deputy Nalwalker's initial approach of

juror Smith was not authorized by the trial court, it was within
the scope of his duty to assist in the trial proceedings and
cannot reasonably be characterized as "verbal contact beyond mere
civilit[y]."

.Id. at 909.

Furthermore, Deputy Nalwalker's second

approach of juror Smith was clearly authorized by the trial court
(R. at 417). When he returned a few moments later, Deputy
Nalwalker merely informed juror Smith that the judge had
requested that he (Nalwalker) and the bailiff drive Smith to the
cafe where the other jurors were eating lunch (R. at 265, 30809).

Deputy Nalwalker, the bailiff and juror Smith then drove,

"without conversing," approximately one or two miles to Dayna's
Cafe where Smith joined the other jurors (R. at 265; 308-09).
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Deputy
Nalwalker did not engage Smith in conversation or otherwise
conduct himself in a manner which would have had the affect of
breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly effect Smith's
judgment as to Nalwalker's credibility.

Id. at 908; £f. State v.

Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279-80 (Utah 1985) (conversation concerning
personal incident between witness who was arresting officer as
well as an eyewitness held sufficient to breed an improper sense
of familiarity).

The incidental nature of the initial contact,

the subsequent authorization by the trial court, the presence of
the bailiff and the complete lack of conversation, substantive or
otherwise, demonstrate that defendant's allegations of improper
contact are without merit and need not be reviewed by this Court.
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POINT V
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT
DEFENDANT OF THE INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
MANSLAUGHTER.
In points V and VI of his brief, defendant appears to
allege that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the
included offense of manslaughter.

However, he levels this

allegation with absolutely no discussion of the evidence actually
presented or how that evidence was deficient.

Rather, defendant

appears to attack the lack of additional evidence which might
possibly have implicated someone else as the shooter.

He appears

to further allege that certain evidence introduced at trial could
not have been in existence. 29
The power of this Court to review a jury verdict
challenged on the sufficiency of the evidence is "quite limited."
State v. Mooref 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

The

evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it, must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.

State v.

Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct.
1837 (1990).

Thus, this Court requires defendants challenging

the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal to marshal all the
evidence in support of the jury's verdict and then demonstrate
that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the verdict,
the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.

Moore, 802

P.2d at 738-39 (adopting the "marshal the evidence" standard for

Although defendant argues that Sheriff Gottfredson's markings
indicating the location of certain shell casings were eliminated
by rain, Sheriff Gottfredson testified that the markings were
still present the morning after the alleged rain (T. at 266).
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use in criminal appeals from jury verdicts where sufficiency of
the evidence is at issue).

Where, as here, the defendant has

wholly failed to marshal the evidence, this Court need not and
should not consider the challenge to its sufficiency.

Id.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
this Court to affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this IQ

day of March, 1991.

PAUL VAN DAM
Utah Attorney General

RIAN DECKED
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

FILED
PIUTE COUNTY, JUNCTION, UTAH

AUG 2 01990
erk

By

Deputy

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF PIUTE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION IN RE
POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

vs.
LEW DAY,
Case No. 89-CR-19
Defendant.

I N T R O D U C T I O N
Subsequent to the trial and the pronouncement of sentence
herein, the Defendant filed a Motion for a new trial.

As grounds

the Motion alleged:
1.
juror.

Improper

conversation

between

witness and

2.
Improper
prospective juror.

conversation

between

witness and

3. Improper conversation between juror and Clerk
official.
4.

New exculpatory evidence.

5.

Newly-discovered evidence (victimfs shirt).

6.

Newly-discovered evidence (lead fragment).

The wife of the Defendant subsequently filed an affidavit
calling into question the adequacy of representation by defense
counsel David Blackwell and Marcus Taylor of Richfield, Utah.

2
This resulted in a motion to withdraw and for appointment of
substitute counsel for Defendant.

The motion to withdraw was

granted, and with approval of Defendant and his wife, as well as
the County, the Court appointed James L. Shumate of Cedar City,
Utah to proceed with representation.
Other post-sentencing motions were also filed, and at the
time hereof there remains pending before the Court the following:
1.
Two State's Motions to strike defense
affidavits or portions thereof which do not comply with
the Rules of Evidence; and further, to strike, naked or
unsupported factual allegations which appear in defense
Motions or Memoranda.
2.
A defense Motion for the appointment of a
private investigator.
3.

A defense Motion for an evidentiary hearing.

4.

The defense Motion for a new trial.

Both sides have filed numerous affidavits which will be
discussed

hereafter.

contradictory.
filed

by

of

the

affidavits

are

not

With only one or two exceptions, the affidavits

the

supplemental

Most

State

contain

information

not

clarifying,
contradicting

explanatory
the

or

factual

allegations contained in the defense affidavits.
The four Motions came before the Court at Junction, Utah, on
Monday, July 30, 1990.

At that time counsel stipulated that the

affidavits on file could be treated by the Court as proffered and
accepted proof reflecting the actual testimony which the affiants
would give (subject to the Rules of Evidence) should they be
called to testify, and that the Court could make findings of fact
based thereon.
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With the foregoing as a backdrop the Court will proceed to
consider the merits of the four pending Motions,
I*

MOTION TO STRIKE

Various defense pleadings as well as affidavits contain
hearsay, rumor, innuendo, speculation and assumptions.
the State's motions to strike may be well taken.

As such

Nevertheless

the Court has determined to deny the motions and to evaluate both
supported and unsupported allegations and to leave the same in
the record for purposes of appellate review.

In this regard the

Court gives an expansive construction to the recent Supreme Court
ruling in State v. Hadfield, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1990) which is
discussed more extensively hereafter.
II.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR

Defendant seeks appointment of a private investigator for
the purpose of interviewing Ms. Bobbie Cox and Mr. Bo-Jon Reef.
The stated purpose of the investigation would be to inquire as to
an alleged post-trial statement by State's witness Lewis Sudweeks
to the effect, "Looks like I got away with another one".
The record reveals that subsequent to the trial herein, the
defense
Pectol.

hired

a private

investigator by the name of Blaine

The results of Pectol's investigation are contained in

two reports prepared

by him and filed herein.

indicate

conducted

that

Pectol

numerous

The reports

interviews

including

interviews of Ms. Bobbie Cox and Mr. Bo-Jon Reef and further
investigated the crime scene, reviewed all of the evidence in the
trial and generally investigated post-trial rumors, suggestions
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and second-guessing.
The record

further discloses post-trial

investigation by

Piute County Sheriff Brent Gottfredson which he conducted as a
matter of public duty and as a result of the reports, accusations
and matters brought to his attention by the Defendants wife or
by the various post-trial pleadings filed by the defense.

He

likewise interviewed Ms. Bobbie Cox to whom the statement, "Looks
like I got away with another one," was allegedly made.
The defense theory that the perpetrator of the crime was
State witness Lewis Sudweeks was advanced at trial and rejected
by the jury.
not

Additional evidence thereof would be cumulative and

new.

The

investigator

and

post-trial

the

investigation

County Sheriff have

credibility to this defense theory.

by

the

private

failed to add any

The statement in question

purportedly made by the said witness comes to the Court in the
form

of

hearsay,

twice

and

thrice

corroboration or contextual framework.
by

nature

is

susceptible

removed,

without

any

It is a statement which

of different

meanings

and

defense

counsel in Open Court at the time of the hearing hereon candidly
acknowledged that he could not project the results of additional
inquiry if a private investigator were appointed.
It appears to the Court that the defense is seeking to
embark on a sort of "fishing expedition" stimulated principally
by

rumor,

innuendo,

speculation

and

wishful

thinking.

The

defense is unable to point to clear definitive evidence, but
rather to the possibility that something might be discovered.
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Since this arises in a post-conviction setting, the timing seems
inappropriate.
The record further discloses that prior to the trial herein
the attorneys who represented Defendant through trial# to-wit:
Marcus

Taylor

and

David

Blackwell,

conducted

considerable

investigatory work; that they traveled to Marysvale, Junction,
Circleville, Panguitch and Escalante and interviewed numerous
witnesses, including roost of those whom the defense now would
call at an evidentiary hearing in support of its Motion for a new
trial and particularly one Bobbie Cox.
The Court is satisfied that proper investigatory work has
already been conducted in this case, both before and after the
trial; that it has been conducted not only by the office of the
County

Sheriff

but

also

by

defense

investigator hired for the defense.

counsel

and

a

private

All three have interviewed

the said Bobbie Cox at least once and such interviews have been
conducted both before and after the trial.
The Court is not satisfied that appointment of a private
investigator is warranted or would be productive and accordingly
the motion therefor is denied.
III.

MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

The Court has considered

the Motion

for an evidentiary

hearing in light of the recent decision in State v. Hadfield,
supra.

That decision is not entirely clear as to the quality of

evidence which must be laid before the Court as a foundational
premise for an evidentiary hearing.

It seems to suggest that
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"proffered evidence" or "allegations about new evidence", if they
are sufficiently persuasive, may be adequate even though they
fail to comply with the Utah Rules of Evidence.

The opinion does

make clear that the Utah Rules of Evidence would govern at the
evidentiary hearing, but strict adherence when evaluating whether
or not to convene the hearing appears not to be mandated.
Based

on

the

foregoing

construction

of

the

Hadfield

decision, the Court determined not to strike the naked, factual
allegations
defense

which

and

appear

further

in various

determined

to

pleadings

leave

filed

intact

by the

the various

defense affidavits even though in some instances they involve
hearsay, once, twice or thrice removed, as well as opinion,
speculation and conjecture which fail to conform to the Rules of
Evidence.
In a Memorandum filed with the Court the defense has listed
nineteen witnesses it would propose to call at an evidentiary
hearing and the testimony that would be given by each.

The names

of the witnesses, a brief indication of their testimony and the
Court's response follow:
1.

Blaine Pectol, a private investigator, would purportedly

testify that he was hired by a friend of Defendant's to conduct a
post-trial investigation.

He reviewed all of the trial evidence,

located a small lead fragment in a gatepost at the crime scene
which had

not previously

number

witnesses

of

some

been discovered,
of

whom

are

and

listed

potential witnesses at an evidentiary hearing.

interviewed a
hereafter

as

The specific

testimony of the potential witnesses is summarized hereafter.
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As

to

the

proffered

evidence

from

Pectol,

the

Court

determines as follows:
(1)
is essentially
the exception
metal fragment

The purported testimony of Blaine Pectol
hearsay sometimes thrice removed with
of testimony about the location of the
in the gatepost at the crime scene.

(2)
The State's evidence, as depicted on
Exhibit #2, indicated that Defendant fired two shots at
the victim with the gatepost in the background.
(3)
If the metal fragment located in the
gatepost was fired from the Defendant's weapon such
would be consistent with and corroborative of the
State's evidence.
If not, it has no apparent
relevancy.
(4) The Pectol testimony as indicated by his
reports would be cumulative
of theories
already
advanced by the defense during trial and fails to shed
any appreciable additional light thereon.
(5) The information contained in the Pectol
reports even if produced through proper witnesses is
not such as to render a different result probable on
retrial.

The Court also notes that at the hearing hereon there was
admitted

by

stipulation

Investigation
gatepost

could

indicating
not

Defendant's weapon.
2.

a

be

report

that

the

connected

from

the

lead

fragment

to

the

Federal

victim

Bureau

found
nor

of

in the
to

the

As such it appears irrelevant.

George Steven Birdf

is expected to testify that Deputy

Sheriff Robert Nalwalker made statements about the evidence in a
cafe prior to commencement of the trial.
With respect to the proffered

testimony

of George Steven

Bird the Court determines:
(1)
Bird testified at the trial and any
evidence he could give is not newly-discovered as and
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for the reason that it could have been discovered with
reasonable diligence prior to trial.
(2)
Assuming the occurrence of the events
described by Bird there is no showing that they had any
impact on the trial.
3.

Vickie Barton

would purportedly testify that prior to

the trial she heard Bo-Jon Reef state that he heard State witness
Lewis Sudweeks make threats against the victim if the latter did
not stay away from Sudweeks1 girlfriend Bobbie Cox.
With respect to the proffered testimony of Vickie Barton,
the Court determines as follows:
would be
removed.

(1)
The proffered Vickie Barton testimony
inadmissable as hearsay twice or thrice

(2)
Even if admitted, the testimony is
cumulative of a theory already advanced at trial by the
defense.
(3)
The testimony of Vickie Barton is not
newly discovered and with reasonable diligence could
have been discovered prior to the trial.
(4)
such as would
retrial.
4.

The testimony of Vickie Barton is not
render a different result probable on

Bo-Jon Reef would

purportedly

testify that he heard

State witness Lewis Sudweeks make threats against the defendant
and also that the victim was having a love affair with Bobbie
Cox.
With respect to the proffered testimony of Bo-Jon Reef, the
Court determines as follows:
(1)
Bo-Jon Reef was interviewed by Private
Investigator Blaine Pectol.
The information given Pectol
does not support the claim regarding his testimony.
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(2)
There is an absence of any credible
evidence before the Court which would indicate that BoJon Reef would testify in the manner indicated*
(3)
The purported testimony of Bo-Jon Reef
even if admitted would be cumulative of a theory
already advanced by defense at trial.
(4)
The testimony of Bo-Jon Reef is not
newly discovered and with reasonable diligence could
have been discovered prior to the trial.
(5)
The purported testimony of Bo-Jon Reef
is not such as to render a different result probable on
retrial.
5.

Grover Smith, who served as a jurorr would purportedly

testify that the jury did not receive an express instruction on
the right of the jury to find the Defendant innocent.
With respect to the proffered testimony of Grover Smith, the
Court determines as follows:
(1)
The testimony of Grover Smith
regarding
jury
instructions
would
be
irrelevant.
(2)
The jury instructions speak for
themselves and their adequacy or inadequacy
is a matter of law.
6.
trial,

Bill
would

Christensen.
purportedly

who

testified

testify

that

for
State

the

defense

witness

at

Lewis

Sudweeks, while under the influence of alcohol, stated to his
girlfriend,
"Looks

like

Bobbie Cox, who later repeated
I

got

away

with

another

Sudweeks and Cox had violent fights.

it to Christensen,

one,".

Further,

that

Further, that Sudweeks told

him the shirt belonging to the victim, along with a hat belonging
to

one

Evan

Wiltshire

and

gloves

belonging

to

the

Defendant
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burned up in Sudweeks1 pickup truck*
With respect to the purported testimony of Bill Christensen,
the Court determines as follows:
(1) The implication that the perpetrator of
the crime was Lewis Sudweeks rather than the Defendant
was advanced at trial and rejected by the jury.
(2)
Matters in relation to the victimfs
shirt were raised and argued at trial along with
questions regarding other items in the Defendants
pickup, the impoundment and inventory thereof, etc.
(3)
The matter of fights between Lewis
Sudweeks and Bobbie Cox was likewise a subject of
evidence at trial.
(4)
The
purported
testimony
of
Bill
Christensen is cumulative of evidence and theories
already advanced by the defense at trial and are not
such as to render a different result probable on
retrial.
7.

Buddy

Ross

would

purportedly

testify

that

he

heard

Bobbie Cox in a fight with Lewis Sudweeks after the trial state
that she knew that Lewis Sudweeks had killed David Kile.
With respect to the proffered testimony of Buddy Ross, the
Court determines as follows:
(1)
There is nothing in the record from
which the Court can ascertain the basis under which the
defense advances the purported testimony of Ross.
There is no statement as to who talked with Ross or to
whom Ross provided this information.
(2) The expression of an opinion by Bobbie
Cox
regarding
who
committed
the
crime
is not
admissable.
(3)
Bobbie Cox has been interviewed before
and after the trial by the private investigator and the
County Sheriff and the interviews have not produced any
evidence which corroborates or lends credibility to the
purported testimony of Ross.
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(4) The matters concerning which Ross would
purportedly testify, even if property introduced in
evidence, are cumulative of theories already advanced
and rejected, and are not such as to render a different
result probable on retrial.
8.

Lorie Franklin would purportedly testify that she had a

threatening

and intimidating contact with Lewis Sudweeks after

the trial at which time Sudweeks reportedly said, "You did what
you had to do; well, I did what I had to last summer".
With regard to the proffered testimony of Lorie Franklin,
the Court determines as follows:
(1)
Lorie Franklin was a witness for the
defense at trial and gave testimony which called into
question the credibility and veracity of Lewis Sudweeks
and further cast him in a negative and derogatory
light.
(2)
Though inappropriate, a post-trial
intimidating and threatening confrontation
between
Sudweeks and Franklin is of limited if any relevancy.
(3) The statement, "You did what you had to
do; well, I did what I had to do last summer", is
susceptible
of
different
meanings
and
requires
conjecture and speculation.
(4)
There is no evidence before the Court
that would make clear the meaning of the alleged
statement.
(5)
The defense effort to shift blame to
State witness Lewis Sudweeks was clearly advanced at
trial and rejected by the jury.
(6)
The Lorie Franklin testimony, even if
properly admitted, is not such as would render a
different result probable on retrial.
9.
testify

Leland Millett. who served as a juror, would purportedly
regarding

attributed

to

the

Millett

jury
that

deliberations.
suggests

any

There

is

impropriety

nothing
in

the
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deliberations

or

that

seriously

threatens

the

verdict.

The

purported testimony comes to the Court in the form of the notes
of

the

private

investigator,

Blaine

Pectol,

regarding

his

telephone conference with Leland Millett.
With regard to the proffered testimony of Leland Millett the
Court determines as follows:
(1)
The
regarding Millet is
Pectol report.

information before the Court
entirely hearsay based on the

(2)
Even if the statements attributed to
Millet were properly before the Court they would not
form an adequate basis to upset the jury verdict.
10.
live-in

Bobbie Cox would purportedly
girlfriend

of

Lewis

Sudweeks;

testify that
that

there

she is a
are

some

discrepancies between the testimony of Sudweeks and things he has
told her, e.g. what happened to the victim's clothing and the
location of the Defendant's pickup along with other items which
appear to have no relevancy at all to this case.
With regard to the proffered testimony of Bobbie Cox the
Court determines as follows:
(1)
The Court notes the absence of any
indication that Bobbie Cox would offer evidence that
Lewis Sudweeks was the perpetrator of the homicide.
This is striking since the proffers from the other
witnesses
which
implicate
Sudweeks
base
such
implication on statements purportedly made by or to
Bobbie Cox.
(2) The purported testimony advances defense
theories which were rejected by the jury.
(3)
Bobbie Cox was interviewed by defense
counsel before the trial and could have been called as
a witness by either side.
Evidence she could give
would not be "newly discovered."
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(4) The testimony of Bobbie Cox, if properly
admitted, would be cumulative and not such as to render
a different result probable on retrial.
11.

Larry John Norman would purportedly testify that prior

to the homicide he heard Lewis Sudweeks threaten the life of the
victim.
With regard to the proffered testimony of Larry John Norman
the Court determines as follows:
(1)
The purported testimony of Larry John
Norman is directly contradictory to the information
which he supplied the private investigator, Blaine
Pectol, and the County Sheriff as reflected by the
report of the former and affidavit of the latter.
(2) The record reveals that Norman has been
interviewed several times both before and after the
trial and any evidence he could now give could have
been discovered with reasonable diligence prior to the
trial and would not qualify as "newly-discovered".
(3)
Even if Norman were to testify as
purported, such testimony would be cumulative of a
theory already advanced by the defense at trial.
(4)
Even if Norman were to testify as
purported, such testimony is not likely to render a
different result probable on retrial.
12.

Linda

King

would

purportedly

testify

that

Lewis

Sudweeks had made threats against the victim if he didn't stay
away from Bobbie Cox.
With regard to the proffered testimony of Linda King, the
Court determines as follows:
(1) The basis for the proffer on King is an
interview conducted by the private investigator Pectol.
In the interview King states that her source is Larry
John Norman whose proffered testimony is summarized
immediately above.
The statements given the private
investigator and the Sheriff by Larry John Norman
contradict the information King claims to have received
from Norman.
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(2) Even if the King testimony could somehow
be elevated to a level of admissability it would be
cumulative of a theory already advanced by the defense
at trial and rejected by the jury.
(3)
The testimony of Linda King even if
properly admitted would not be such as to render a
different result probable on retrial.
'
13.
affidavit
Sudweeks

Terry Allen

Kile, brother

of the victim,

filed

an

stating that after the homicide State witness Lewis
delivered

to him

belonged to the victim.

two articles

of clothing which had

He further indicated that Sudweeks had

told him that he had placed

a pack of cigarettes

in a shirt

pocket of the victim, but then realizing he was dead, removed the
cigarettes.
With respect to the affidavit of Terry Allen Kile, the Court
determines as follows:
(1)
The affidavit of Terry Allen Kile
contradicts information he purportedly gave the private
investigator Pectol as set forth in the latter's
report.
He is alleged to have told the private
investigator that he did not receive any clothing from
Lewis Sudweeks.
(2)
The defense has already advanced at
trial a theory concerning the presence or absence of
clothing, as well as cigarettes and evidence relating
thereto would be cumulative and not new.
(3)
Both Terry Kile and Lewis Sudweeks
testified at trial and the information concerning
clothing
and cigarettes would have been
readily
discoverable with reasonable diligence prior to the
trial and could have been produced at the trial.
Accordingly, such evidence is not "newly discovered".
(4)
Lewis Sudweeks was examined and crossexamined extensively at trial regarding every detail of
his account and any inconsistencies therein were the
subject both of much evidence and argument. Additional
evidence in this regard would be cumulative and not
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such as would likely render a different result probable
on retrial.
14.
that

Nancy Christensen would purportedly testify

she attended

the trial on one day and observed

jurors who fell asleep.

She will also testify that

Lewis Sudweeks has made inconsistent statements.
With regard to the proffered testimony of Nancy Christensen,
the Court determines as follows:
(1) The Court takes judicial notice of all
proceedings involving the jury in Open Court and Mrs.
Christensen's purported testimony adds nothing thereto.
(2)
The Court finds no impropriety in the
conduct of the jury in Open Court.
(3) The theory of inconsistent statements by
State witness Lewis Sudweeks was advanced and argued
extensively by the defense at trial.
(4) Nancy Christensen was at the trial and
would have been available as a witness and any
testimony
she
could
give
would
not
be
"newly
discovered".
(5)
There is nothing in the purported
testimony of Mrs. Christensen which is likely to render
a different result probable on retrial.
15.
has

Pat Yero, who was subpoenaed by the defense at trial,

filed

misconduct.

two

affidavits

herein

regarding

alleged

Those affidavits are discussed elsewhere.

juror

A defense

memorandum indicates that she would also testify that she saw a
deputy

sheriff

talk

with

other

exclusionary order was entered.

witnesses

after

the

Courtfs

Further, she claims to have seen

Lewis Sudweeks upstairs during the trial sitting outside the open
courtroom
courtroom.

door and

listening to the testimony

from inside the
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With

regard

to the proffered

testimony

of Pat Yero, the

Court determines as follows:
(1) The proffered testimony of Yero regarding the conduct of witnesses is general and wholly
lacking in specificity*
There is no indication as to
when, how long or substance. The Yero affidavits filed
several months ago make no reference to the alleged
problems now raised by proffer.
(2)
During the course of trial the Court
frequently cautioned jurors, witnesses and members of
the public and no violations or improprieties were
reported to the Court.
(3) Pat Yero as well as other persons named
in Defendants Memorandum have previously submitted
letters and materials to this Court evidencing their
friendship with and support of Defendant.
Some have
also appeared as sureties on the Defendant's bail bond.
While they have been liberal and conclusionary in their
general criticism, none have come forward in a timely
manner to identify with specificity any problem or
impropriety in the conduct of the trial.
(4) The Court has not received any indication from counsel for either side or from any Court
personnel which would tend to establish impropriety in
the proceedings.
(5) While the Court has accepted proffers in
keeping with what it understands to be the spirit of
the Hadfield decision, it is of the opinion that the
proffers
must
allege
specific
facts
which,
if
subsequently established at an evidentiary hearing,
would warrant relief. The Court is of the opinion that
it is not enough to "flock shoot" or to come forward
months later and throw out some general accusations.
16.

Terry V. Mason would purportedly testify that she is

the sister-in-law to the Defendant and that she was called as a
witness by surprise.

Further, she would testify that the Sheriff

and his deputy had made inconsistent statements.
With regard to the proffered testimony of Terry V. Mason,
the Court determines as follows:
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(1)
Terry Mason was called as witness for
the purpose of identifying a cigarette lighter belonging to Defendant and after the Court had ruled that the
Defendant's wife could not be called nor could the
Sheriff testify as to identification of the lighter by
the wife.
(2)
It was proper to call Terry Mason for
the purpose identified even though she had not previously been listed as a witness.
(3) Any other information which Terry Mason
could have given would not be "newly discovered" and
should have been produced at the trial.
(4)
Any testimony which Terry Mason could
give
regarding
inconsistent
statements
would
be
cumulative and not new and would not be such as to
render a different result probable on retrial.
17.

Kent Mason would purportedly testify that he observed

jurors sleeping during the presentation of the evidence.
With respect to the proffered testimony of Kent Mason, the
Court takes judicial knowledge of the conduct of the jury during
Open Court and finds no impropriety therein.
18.

David

Blackwellf

a defense

attorney,

has

filed

an

affidavit regarding alleged juror misconduct which is discussed
elsewhere herein.
19.

Joseph Johnson, a member of the venire has filed an

affidavit regarding a conversation with the Sheriff during the
jury selection process.

The same is discussed elsewhere herein.

*

The
foregoing

cumulative
identified

impact

*

of

witnesses

*

the
is

testimony
not

such

of
as

all
to

of

the

render

a

different result probable on retrial, State v. Harris, 513 P.2d
439

(Utah 1973) ; and this is so even disregarding the fact that
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much of the testimony would not be "newly discovered", State v.
Hawkins. 16 P2d 713 (Utah 1932), and much would be subject to
exclusion as being irrelevant, immaterial or based upon hearsay
once, twice or thrice removed and not reasonably calculated to
lead to discovery of the truth.
The Court is satisfied that the conviction of the Defendant
is supported by an "unimpeachably fair and even-handed process".
State v. Hadfield, supra, at p. 8.

Further, the Court does not

have any "suspicion that justice may have been miscarried because
of a lack of enlightenment
evidence will supply".

on a vital point, which the new

State v. Harris, supra, at 439-440.

Accordingly the Court concludes that an evidentiary hearing
would not serve a useful purpose, and the motion therefor is
denied.
IV.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

The merits of the defense motion for a new trial has been
necessarily

addressed

discussion.

Specifically, the alleged grounds for a new trial

relating

to

to

so-called

a

"newly

major

extent

discovered

in

the

evidence"

preceding

or

exculpatory evidence" have been examined and found wanting.

"new
In

truth, much of what has been proffered is not newly-discovered
evidence (see State v. Williams. 712 P.2d 220, Utah 1985) but is
cumulative, irrelevant, or inadmissible (see State v. Gellatly,
449 P.2d 993, Utah 1969).
The Court now turns to the grounds for a new trial which
alleged (1) improper conversation between witness and juror, (2)

jf J > ^
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improper conversation between witness and prospective juror, and
(3) improper conversation between juror and clerk official.
The Court approaches this area of inquiry with knowledge of
recent rulings by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Ut. App. 1987); State v. Erickson.
749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1986) and State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah
1985) .

The Court is aware of the standard as enunciated in the

Pike case that:
A rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises from any
unauthorized contact during a trial between witnesses,
attorneys or court personnel and jurors, which goes
beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and brief
contact. At pg. 280.
The Defendant claims two improper contacts with jurors
occurred in this case.

They will be examined in turn.

JUROR GROVER SMITH.

Co-defense counsel David Blackwell

has filed an affidavit stating that during a recess of the trial
he personally observed two conversations between Grover Smith and
Deputy Sheriff Robert Nalwalker.

The affidavit is dated May 23,

1990 and was filed some 50 days after the trial concluded.

At a

hearing herein held on June 7, 1990, co-defense counsel Marcus
Taylor advised the Court that he and Mr. Blackwell had discussed
the contact which Blackwell had observed and had determined there
was

no

decision

problem
not

to

associated
raise

therewith

any

and

objection

in

accordingly

made a

relation

thereto.

Plaintiff has filed three affidavits by Deputy Nalwalker, County
Clerk Valeen Brown and juror Grover Smith which do not contradict
the Blackwell affidavit, but clarify and explain the conversations referred to therein.

Counsel stipulated that the Court
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could treat the affidavits as testimony.

Simply stated, at a

noon recess juror Grover Smith emerged from the men's room and
discovered the other jurors had been taken to a local cafe for
lunch.

Smith briefly discussed the problem with Deputy Nalwalk-

er , who went to the Judge's chambers and asked for instructions.
The Judge directed
(who with

consent

transport

juror

that Deputy Nalwalker and the County Clerk
of

Smith

all counsel
to

the

served

cafe.

as a baliff)

Nalwalker

should

reported

the

Court's instructions to Smith and the three traveled to the cafe
in silence.
With respect to juror Grover Smith the Court determines as
follows:
(1) The affidavits on file are not contradictory
but are in harmony with each other.
(2) There is not an issue of any material fact
regarding the contact between juror Grover Smith and
Deputy Robert Nalwalker.
(3) There was no conversation between the juror
and the Deputy other than that which was required to
identify the fact of the juror's needing to be
transported to a local cafe and of the arrangements
made in relation thereto.
(4) Other than for the identification of the
problem the contact was authorized by the Court and
consisted of carrying out the express directive of the
Court.
(5) The contact did not relate to the merits of
the case in any way.
(6) The contact did not involve discussion of any
personal or private matters and was not such that it
would breed a sense of familarity.
(7)
Taken together, the affidavits which are
complimentary, explanatory and clarifying, and not
contradictory, satisfactorily rebut the presumption
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that prejudice to the Defendant resulted from the
contact between juror Smith and Deputy Nalwalker.
(8) Defense counsel were aware of the contact in
question and made a decision not to raise any question
in relation thereto.
The Court concludes this
constituted a waiver. It would not be appropriate for
defense counsel to invite error, albeit by silence, and
then to rely thereon. See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d
1257 (Utah 1989)
JUROR LESLIE SMITH/MARY MIKE CISERELIA.
has

filed

two

affidavits

of

one

Patricia

Yero

The defense
claiming

a

conversation between a juror and a person in the clerk's office
regarding personal matters.

The State has filed three affidavits

by County Clerk Valeen Brown, juror Mary Mike Ciserella and
alternate

juror

conversation.

Leslie
The

Smith

Yero

which

(defense)

clarify

and

affidavits

explain the
describe

a

conversation in which a young, slender juror with long black hair
had a discussion with a person in the clerk's office about their
boys sleeping over, about the juror having work to do at home,
and about the juror's desire to have the trial concluded.

The

defense affidavits do not indicate the identity of the person in
the clerk's office and are unclear as to the identification of
the juror.

The second Yero affidavit assumes that the juror was

Mary Mike Ciserella.
The three affidavits filed by Plaintiff establish with
certainty

that

the alleged

improper conversation was between

Leslie Smith, an alternate juror, and one Zina Wiltshire an
employee

from the office of the public health nurse who was

temporarily assisting in the office of the county clerk while the
regular clerk personnel were involved with the trial.

Leslie
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Smith, the alternate juror, is young, slender, with long black
hair and has a boy the same age as Zina Wiltshire.
has,

by

Wiltshire

affidavit,
which

is

acknowledged
consistent

a

Leslie Smith

conversation

with

the

with

description

Zina

of

the

conversation contained in the two Yero affidavits filed by the
defense.

On the other hand, Juror Mary Mike Ciserella is blonde

and pregnant, does not have a boy, has only two small daughters
ages two and three and one-half years and, by affidavit, has
denied

any

regarding

conversation
boys

affidavits.

and

the

with

anyone

other

items

in

the

clerk's

mentioned

in

office

the

Yero

The affidavit of the County Clerk reaffirms that

Zina Wiltshire substituted in her office on the day when Yero was
paid a witness fee and that Leslie Smith was paid by the two
vouchers

issued

on

the

same

date,

immediately

prior

to

the

voucher issued to Yero.
As heretofore noted counsel stipulated that the Court could
treat

the

affidavits

as

proffered

testimony

accepted

by

both

sides and could proceed to make findings of fact based thereon.
After careful consideration of the testimony thus admitted, the
Court determines as follows, to-wit:
(1) Zina Wiltshire, an employee in the office of
the public health nurse temporarily assisted in the
county clerk's office on March 28, 1990.
(2) Zina Wiltshire was not regularly associated
with the county clerk's office, was not a witness in
the proceedings and had no involvement with the trial.
(3) The county clerk's
Patricia Yero on March 28,
that alternate juror Leslie
service immediately prior to
fee.

records reflect payment to
1990, and further reflect
Smith was paid for jury
payment of Yero's witness
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(4)
Alternate juror Leslie Smith fits the
description contained in all of the affidavits as to
the person that had the alleged improper conversation
with the clerk official. Mary Mike Ciserella does not
fit the description.
(5) The alleged improper conversation did in fact
take place between Zina Wiltshire who was assisting
temporarily in the clerk's office and alternate juror
Leslie Smith and did not involve juror Mary Mike
Ciserella in any way.
(6) Since Leslie Smith was an alternate juror and
did not participate in the deliberations no prejudice
could have resulted therefrom and accordingly the Court
need not inquire further.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR JOSEPH JOHNSON
The final claim of an improper contact is. alleged to have
occurred

between

Sheriff

Brent

Gottfredson

and

one

Joseph

Johnson, a member of the venire.
Joseph Johnson has filed an affidavit claiming he was
one

of

16

selection

potential
after

the

jurors

who

completion

remained

of

available

challenges

for

for

jury

cause.

He

states that at a recess before exercise of preemptory challenges
the

Sheriff

asked

him

his

name.

Johnson

Sheriff told him he still could not place him.

responded

and

the

Johnson then told

the Sheriff who his mother and grandfather were and that he had
lived most of his life in Circleville.

That is the whole of the

conversation.

with

Johnson

was

stricken

the

State's

first

preemptory challenge.
The State has not filed a counter affidavit, though the
transcript of the jury selection proceedings reflects different
timing.

The Court

record

reflects

that the Court took a 10

minute recess prior to seating the 16 jurors who ultimately were
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passed for cause.

There was no further recess thereafter until

the jury was fully impaneled.

Prior to taking the recess the

Court stated "why donft we take a 10 minute recess right now
folks.

Let me just indicate, please don't go out and talk about

this case with anyone.
this case."

Talk about other things, but not about

(Transcript of Proceedings, Jury Selection, p. 76)

Accepting Johnsonfs statement regarding the conversation, this
would have been the latest time in the proceedings that it could
have occurred.

The conversation alleged by Johnson does not

violate the Court's caution.
The Court further takes judicial notice of a letter of April
15, 1990, submitted to it by Joseph Johnson while the Defendant
was awaiting sentencing.

In the letter from Joseph Johnson to

the Court he states "I truly believe I could have been fair, but
looking back maybe I shouldnft have been on the jury after all.
Because as I said, I have known both Lew [the Defendant] and
Lewis [the prosecution's eyewitness] for years and I know Lew is
a good man and I know what Lewis is." [Emphasis by Johnson]
Vickie Barton, mother of Joseph Johnson, also filed a letter with
the Court in behalf of the Defendant prior to sentencing and has
been named as a potential defense witness should an evidentiary
hearing be held.

With respect to the alleged improper contact

between the Sheriff and Joseph Johnson the Court determines as
follows:
(1) There is no
conversation between
which occurred at a
seated and passed for

material issue in relation to the
Joseph Johnson and the Sheriff
recess prior to the panel being
cause.
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(2) Neither the Sheriff
nor Joseph
violated the Court's instructions to avoid
about the case.

Johnson
talking

(3) The Sheriff asked Johnson for his name. It
was given.
The Sheriff stated he still didn't place
Johnson and so Johnson told him who his mother and
grandfather were. Johnson also stated he had lived in
Circleville most of his life. Nothing else was said.
(4) Joseph Johnson was stricken in a preemptory
challenge exercised by the State.
(5) There
is no evidence that the State's
exercise of its preemptory challenge was improper in
any way.
(6) The letter from Joseph Johnson to the Court
of April 15, 1990, suggests a personal bias by Joseph
Johnson in favor of the Defendant and against the
eyewitness for the Plaintiff.
(7) Joseph Johnson offered no information during
the jury selection process and in response to questions
by the Court or counsel which would have revealed his
prejudice or bias in favor of the Defendant.
(8) There is nothing in the record to evidence
the basis on which the State exercised its preemptory
challenges, but it appears that it may have advanced
the interests of fairness and justice by striking a
potential juror who subsequently appears to have had a
built-in bias in favor of the Defendant and against a
key state witness.
CLAIM OF INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION
While not originally advanced as a basis for a new trial,
the affidavit of the Defendant's wife, Arva Lee Day, calls into
question the adequacy of representation by defense counsel Marcus
Taylor.

The affidavit contains excessive hearsay,

opinions

and

unsupported

conclusions
allegations

and

highly-generalized

regarding

discovery.

unsupported

and

With

factually
respect to

this affidavit and the allegations therein contained, the Court
determines as follows:
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(1) There is nothing in the record which would
suggest anything other than full compliance with
discovery requests.
(2) This Court has heard hundreds of cases during
the last seventeen years, including numerous homicide
cases, and at the conclusion of this trial expressed
the opinion, and restates it here, that this is perhaps
the best tried case on the part of both the prosecution
and the defense that this Court has heard.
(3) This Court is not aware of any fact or factor
which would tend to establish that this Defendant did
not
receive
thorough
and
competent
legal
representation.
(4) The Court has appointed new
Defendant's appeal and/or pre-appeal
based
on
Defendant's
request
dissatisfaction with prior counsel,
evidence that Defendant was not well
to appointment of new counsel.

counsel to handle
motions. This is
and
upon
his
and not upon any
represented prior

C O N C L U S I O N
The Court concludes that there is an inadequate basis for
granting

a

new

trial

represented

and

fairly

population

(some

1500

herein.

The

tried.

people)

Defendant

Piute
as

County

is Junction

county seat is located (some 200 people).
to guard against potential problems.

was
is

Town

properly
small
where

in
the

Great care was taken

There are limited restroom

facilities in the Courthouse and only two small cafes in town to
service the needs of all who participated
Court

issued

directives

giving

jurors

in the trial.

preferential

access

The
to

restroom facilities and encouraging the jurors to eat at one cafe
and others involved with the trial to eat at the other cafe or
elsewhere.

On more than one occassion the Court arranged to have

meals prepared and brought to the Court House for the jurors.
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Frequent admonishments were given to the jury and all others
associated with the trial and a high level of cooperation and
professionalism was exhibited.

The Defendant was fairly tried

and convicted by a jury of his peers and there is no basis for
granting a new trial.
This is a final Order, and accordingly, the Defendant is
again admonished of his right to appeal within the time allowed
by law.

T

:his l\

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing MEMORANDUM IN RE POST-TRIAL MOTIONS was
placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with firstclass

postage

thereon

fully

prepaid

on

the

/ /

August, 1990, addressed as follows:
Mr. K. L. Mclff
Piute County Attorney
P. O. Box 100
Richfield, Utah 84701
James Shumate
Attorney at Law
P. O. Box 623
Cedar City, Utah

84720

day

of
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person?
A

No.
MR. BLACKWELL:

Thank you.

That's all.

MR. McIFF:

No further questions.

THE COURT:

Thank you, Officer.

Call your next u/itness.
MR. McIFF:

I u/ill call Harold Morrill.

[BAILIFF SUMMONED WITNESS FROM OUTSIDE COURTROOM]
THE COURT:

If you'll raise your right hand and be

su/orn, sir.
[WITNESS SWORN]
THE COURT:

You may be seated here, Mr. Morrill.

HAROLD MORRILL, called and su/orn for Plaintiff, testified
as follou/s:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. McIFF:
Q

Mr. Morrill, u/ould you please state your full name

and address.
A

Harold Darrell Morrill Marysvale, Utah, 10-Mile

Ranch, Marysvale Valley.
Q

You testified at the preliminary hearing in this

matter, did you not?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

Betu/een then and nou; you had an accident u/here you

sustained an injury to your face; is that correct?

PAGE 615

A

Yes.

I did.

Q

Were you residing at the 10-Mile Ranch on August

the 10th, 1989?
A

Yes, I u/as.

Q

Who occupied that home?

A

My dad lived in it then.

Q

Your parents lived there?

A

Yeah.

Q

Were you staying u/ith them at the time—?

A

Yes, I u/as.

Q

—u/ith your children?

A

Um-hm.

They did then.

They've moved since then.

With my little boy and little girl.

We'd

just moved out there right before then.
Q

On the evening of August the 10th, 1989, do you

recall u/hat you u/ere doing tou/ards sundou/n?
A

Yeah.

I u/as giving my little girl a bath.

It u/as

just getting about to their bedtime and I u/as just getting her
and the little boy ready for bed.
Q

Are you acquainted u/ith Leu/is Sudu/eeks?

A

Yes.

Q

Look, will you, a the at STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 1.

I've known Leu/is quite a u/hile.

[INDICATED]
We've undertaken to show on that exhibit t\m
in the lower lefthand corner—?
A

Um-hm.

Dais Merrill hoimt
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[INDICATED ON EXHIBIT]
Q

— t h e lane that leads from the east to that home,—
[INDICATED]

— t o the north of that a road up on a hill that goes up to
US-89-[INDICATED]
— t h e Thompsonville Road, running north, and a road that goes
to the Paul Henrie ranch, running to the southeast;—
[INDICATED]
— a r e you familiar u/ith that area?
A

Yeah.

Q

Is that a reasonable approximation of the road

pattern and other features in that area?
[INDICATED EXHIBIT]
A

Yeah.

That looks right.

Q

Did you have contact u/ith Leu/is Sudu/eeks on the

night of August the 10th?
A

Yeah.

He come up to the ranch.

Q

Where u/ere you u/hen he came?

A

I u/as in the kitchen and I looked out the window

and I could just see somebody coming up the lane to the house.
He u/as about half u/ay up the lane u/hen I seen him.
Q

What did you do?

A

I didn't know who it was at first.

And as he got a

little bit closer, then I could tell who it was and so I
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i

stepped out of the house to see u/hat u/as going on and talked

2

t o him.

3

Q

Did you t a l k u/ith him?

4

A

Yeah.

5

Q

What d i d h e say?

6 I]

A

H e told m e that—u/hen h e got u p t o t h e h o u s e , h e

I did.

7

came u p t o t h e steps a n d got t o t h e steps and I asked h i m u/hat

8

u/as going o n . And h e told m e that Leu/ had been shooting at

9

h i m a n d h e u/anted m e — h e asked u/here D a d u/as a n d h e u/anted a

IO

ride home.

n

Q

A n y t h i n g e l s e h e said?

12

A

N o . Just that that Leu/ had been shooting at him.

13

H e u/anted m e t o g o u/ith h i m back down t o the truck and talk t o

14

Leu/ again.

But I had m y little girl in t h e b a t h t u b s o I

is

couldn't.

I told h i m I couldn't g o and I asked h i m if h e

16

u/anted t o come in t h e house and sit down, that dad u/as u p

17

m o v i n g t h e s p r i n k l e r s , and h e said n o , h e ' d just u/ait out

18

there o n t h e s t e p s .

19
20
2i

Q

S o I u/ent back in t h e h o u s e .

D o y o u h a v e any u/ay o f identifying a p p r o x i m a t e l y

u/hen that u/as?
A

It u / a s — I ' m not sure o f t h e time.

It u/as just, y o u

22

knouz, in t h e e v e n i n g just a s t h e s u n u/as going d o w n .

23

either down o r , y o u know, it w a s d u s k .

24

c l o c k , so I'm n o t sure o f t h e t i m e .

25

Q

It u/as

I hadn't looked at the

After y o u and h e h a d the b r i e f c o n v e r s a t i o n , h e
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wanted you to go back with him, but you weren't able to
because you were taking care of your children.

What did he do

and what did you do?
A

I went in the house to get Melisa out of the

bathtub and put Kevin in.
Q

What did he do?

A

He was sitting on the steps when I went in

and—excuse me—I went in the house and after I got Melisa
out, I come out and he was gone.
Mandy.

And my niece was there,

She was outside hanging clothes and I asked her where

he went and she said she didn't know if he'd went u p —
[INDICATED]
— o r that way or what.
[INDICATED]
Q

Your dad was not there then?

A

No.

Q

And he arrived?

A

He come in just—I don't know.

Probably 10 or 15

minutes after that, he come in the house.
Q

Where did you meet your father?

A

Just on the porch.

I started to tell him what, you

know, was going on and, you know, I really didn't know what
was going on.

I started to tell Dad what Lewis had told me

and that's when Lewis come through the door a second time.
Q

How did he come through the door?
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1 II

A

H e come through it.

H e didn't open it or nothing.

2

H e knocked it off the hinges and come in.

3

off the hinges and just come busting in.

H e broke the door

4

Q

Were you able to observe his demeanor?

5

A

H e u/as scared.

6

Q

Did he say anything?

7

A

H e u/as saying all kinds o f stuff and then he told

H e u/as real scared.

8

Dad to call the cops and he just said Lew had shot his buddy.

9

And Dad sat and talked to him then and then called u p Brent.

10

Q

When you came out of the bathroom, after having

n

taken care of your children, out into the kitchen area, you

12

say he u/as gone then?

13

A

Yeah.

u

Q

D o you recall doing anything else before your

15
16

H e u/as gone then.

f a t h e r came i n ?
A

J u s t I ' d got M e l i s a ' s pajamas on her and got Kevin

17

out of t h e t u b and I j u s t had him i n a tou/el u/hile I u/as

18

t a l k i n g t o dad.

19

Dad and t h a t ' s u/hen Leu/is came back.

I u/as j u s t d r y i n g him off and u/as t a l k i n g t o

20

MR. McIFF:

21

You can cross examine.

22

THE COURT:

23

see.

Counsel?
CROSS EXAMINATION

24
25

I

B Y MR. BLACKWELL:
Q

Okay.

I don't want to call you Mr. Morrill. W e
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know each other too well to do that.

So, Harold, let me ask

you when Lewis came over the first time, he said that Lew had
shot at him, but he didn't say anything about David Kile being
shot at that time, did he?
A

No.

He didn't.

Q

Did he state, also, that he wanted a ride to

Kingston?
A

Yes.

He did.

Q

Now you will recall that you testified in

preliminary hearing.
A

Um-hm.

Q

You also recall that your testimony at that time

was that Lewis disappeared off the porch for approximately 20
to 30 minutes?
A

Yeah.

It was during the time when I got Melisa out

of the tub until dad was there.

Probably was somewhere in

there.
Q

20?

A

Yes.

Q

20 to 30 minutes?

A

Yeah.

Q

When Lewis showed up, he had a beer in his hand,

Somewhere in there.

didn't he?
A

Yes, he did.

Q

In fact, he sat and drank that beer as you and he
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1

talked.

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Did you hear any shots that night?

4

A

N o . I didn't hear n o t h i n g .

5

[COUNSEL CHECKED NOTES]

6 II

MR. B L A C K W E L L :

7

THE COURT:

8

n
12
13

T h a n k you.

Counsel?

REDIRECT

9
io

T h a t ' s all I h a v e .

EXAMINATION

B Y MR. M c I F F :
Q

M r . M o r r i l l , d o you recall at any time that evening

looking at a clock?
A

N o . I n e v e r did look a t a c l o c k .

a n y r e a s o n to, you k n o w .

I didn't have

I u/as j u s t - -

14

Q

The times you've given u s , are they estimates?

15

A

Y e s . They are.

i6

Q

When you l e f t Leu/is Sudu/eeks s i t t i n g on your p o r c h ,

17 u/ent back in the bathroom, u/as your daughter in the tub then?
18

A

Yes, she u/as.

19

Q

Y o u got her out?

20

A

21

Q

And y o u r l i t t l e b o y , put h i m i n a tou/el?

22

A

Put h i m i n the t u b .

Yes.

But i n the m e a n t i m e , u/hile h e

23

u/as in the tub, I got her p a j a m a s and stuff on.

24

m e 5 t o 10 m i n u t e s .

25

there b y that t i m e .

Probably took

And t h e n I got h i m out and then dad u/as
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'

Q

And was Lewis gone by that time?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

S o w h a t e v e r t i m e l a p s e it u/as, c a n y o u r e m e m b e r

4

doing anything other than getting your daughter out and then

5

putting your son in, and then you got her pajamas on and then

6

y o u got y o u r s o n out a n d w r a p p e d h i m in a towel and w a l k e d

7

back out?

Lewis was gone and your dad came in?

8

A

Yes, however long that took.

9

Q

Okay.

io

MR. McIFF:

11

BY MR. BLACKWELL:

13

Q

H a r o l d , y o u a l s o said y o u w e n t out and t a l k e d to

Mandy—?

15
16

Thank you.

RECROSS EXAMINATION

12

14

I think that's all.

A

Yeah.

I asked her where Lewis had went and she

said s h e d i d n ' t k n o w if h e ' d w e n t d o w n t h e lane or u p t h e r o a d

17 where dad was changing sprinklers.
18

Q

—and

20

A

Um-hm.

21

Q

A n d y o u a l s o g a v e h i m a b a t h d u r i n g that t i m e ?

22

A

19

23

24
25

took y o u r girl o u t , and y o u r b o y w a s in t h e

tub?

Yes.

MR. BLACKWELL:

That's all

I have.

FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. McIFF:
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Q

Do you have any u/ay of knou/ing u/hen Leu/is Sudu/eeks

l e f t your porch?
A

I don't.

Q

You u/ere in the bathroom?

A

Yeah.

By the time I u/ent in—just in the time I

u/ent in and got Melisa out of the bathtub.
Q

And came out u/ith your boy?

A

Come out—no.

put Kevin in.
on.

I got Melisa out of the bathtub and

And I came out u/ith Melisa and got her pajamas

When I came out, he u/as gone then.
MR. McIFF:

No further questions.

THE COURT:

Counsel?

MR. BLACKWELL:
THE COURT:

Nothing.

Thank you.

That's all.

May he be excused?
MR. McIFF:

He may.

MR. BLACKWELL:

Yes.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. McIFF:

I call Dale Morrill.

THE COURT:

Would this be a good time to take a

MR. McIFF:

Fine.

THE COURT:

Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, u/e're

recess?

about to take a recess for 10 minutes.

Once again, it's the

duty of this Court to admonish you, you are not to talk about

ADDENDUM D

FILED
PIUTE COUNTY, JUNCTION, UTAH

^ ,

i'M'»

KAY L. McIFF
PIUTE COUNTY ATTORNEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
225 North 100 East
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone: 801 896-5441

MAY 2 9 1990

srffoftY

By

f*icric
Deputy

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF PIUTE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT NALWALKER
Plaintiff,
VS.

LEW DAY,
Case No. 89-CR-19
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SEVIER

)

ROBERT

ss.

NALWALKER,

being

first

duly

sworn

of

oath

deposes and states as follows, to-wit:
1.

I reside in Junction, Utah, am of adult age and

serve Piute County as a deputy sheriff.
2.

I appeared at and assisted in trial proceedings in

the case State of Utah v. Lew Day, held in Junction, Utah,
beginning March 26, 1990 and continuing through March 30, 1990.
3.

At a lunch recess during the course of the trial I

observed one juror, to-wit Grover Smith, emerge from the mens1
restroom.

I was aware that the jurors were being taken to lunch

2
by court officials and I had seen them leave the building, enter
motor vehicles and drive away moments before.

I was surprised to

see Mr. Smith and advised him that the other jurors had gone with
court personnel and that he should have been with them.

I told

Mr. Smith I would go talk to the Judge and see what he wanted us
to do.

I went to the Judgefs chambers, described the problem and

asked for direction.

The Judge told me to take the county clerk,

who served as a bailiff, and deliver Mr. Smith to Dayna's Cafe
were the other jurors had been taken.

I went back out into the

hallway and advised Mr. Smith what the Judge had said and told
him that the clerk and I would take him to were the other jurors
were located.

The three of us entered my motor vehicle on the

south side of the courthouse and we traveled without conversing
with each other to Dayna's Cafe where Mr. Smith joined the other
jurors .
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this

rjS'

day of May, 1990.

ROBERT NALWALKER
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before roe this 5^5"
May, 1990.

^ M ' CUATL-.
NOTARY PUBLIC

Residing a t : lpu^</xi&£
My commission e x p i r e s : £y

day of

3
AFFJPAVTT OF HAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT NALWALKER was placed
in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class
postage thereon fully prepaid on the

Cyi

day of May, 1990,

addressed as follows:
Mr. Marcus Taylor
Mr. David A. Blackwell
Labrum, Taylor & Blackwell
P. O. Box 728
Richfield, Utah 84701

5 ? ^ : Ci^Jzk

FILED
PIUTE COUNTY, JUNCTION, UTAH

JUNHJ990
KAY L. McIFF
PIUTE COUNTY ATTORNEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
225 North 100 East
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone: 801 896-5441

By

}

Deputy

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF PIUTE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT OF GROVER SMITH
Plaintiff,
vs.
LEW DAY,
Case No. 89-CR-19
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

ss.

COUNTY OF PIUTE

GROVER SMITH, being first duly sworn on oath deposes
and states as follows:
1.

I reside on the south edge of Circleville, Utah,

am of adult age and served as a juror in the case State of Utah
v. Lew Day.
2.

During a lunch recess of the Lew Day trial, I came

out of the restroom and noticed the other jurors were gone.

I

then had a brief conversation with Deputy Nalwalker regarding the
fact that other jurors had been transported to a local cafe for
lunch.

Then deputy Nalwalker told me to wait.

He returned in a

2
few moments and told me that he and the County Clerk would take
me to the cafe where the other jurors had gone.

I got in the

Deputy's car and the three of us drove a mile or so to the cafe.
We traveled in silence.

I did not have any other conversation

with Deputy Nalwalker during the trial.
3.

The foregoing is true and accurate.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this^/___ day of June, 1990.

GROVER SMITH
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/yH

day of

June, 1990.

WtJ a. M/MWA

NOTARY PUBLIC /t • /,

Residing at:

^ifl'^-fu

V

V<'-

CUC(tlMMt-,lff-:^\,\

My commission expires: \,sy

-. <

